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ABSTRACT
High-speed data signals transmitted over mobile broadband channels are seriously distorted by
both time-varying effect and frequency-selective fading (FSF). These distortions introduce chal-
lenges since channel variances in both time-domain and frequency-domain form a two-dimensional
channel matrix which is hard to estimate, but meanwhile provide opportunities for information
security since all signals are directly encrypted by the channels which are adequately random
over time, frequency and space. These challenges and opportunities are studied in this thesis
as two parts. In the first part, we propose a novel time-varying channel estimation (TVCE) al-
gorithm named piece-wise time-invariant approximation (PITIA) to estimate a typical type of
mobile broadband channels - the high-speed train (HST) channels. PITIA customizes general
time-varying channel models according to HST channels’ specific features, and outperforms con-
ventional TVCE algorithms by 5-8 dB in terms of estimation error in typical HST channels. In
the second part, we propose the first physical-layer challenge-response authentication mechanism
(PHY-CRAM) which uses the mobile broadband channels to prevent eavesdropping during au-
thentication. Since pilots and reference signals are eliminated, eavesdroppers cannot demodulate
credential information, while legitimate receivers use the channels’ reciprocal property to cancel
FSF. PITIA is evaluated by computer based simulations, and the effectiveness of PHY-CRAM is
validated by prototyping and real-world experiments. Both pieces of works are built upon a unified
system model and orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) modulation.






Wireless radio frequency (RF) communications provide voice and data services for highly mobile
users. As the infrastructure continues to mature, users are offered the promise of ubiquitous voice
and internet connectivity. However, wireless communications face severe challenges as the number
of users, coverage area and data rates grow, because a signal traversing the wireless medium not
only loses energy density at a quadratic rate, but is also disturbed by ground clutter and interfer-
ences. Moreover, relative frequency shifts (e.g. Doppler spread) become more serious when users
move at higher speeds. These challenges must be addressed to provide reliable services to users at
any time and from anywhere.
Over the years, tremendous efforts have been expended in the areas of channel measurements,
channel modelling, and channel estimation to meet the expanding demands of wireless users.
These focuses are motivated by the need to transmit data over dynamic, time varying, frequency
dependent, and location dependent wireless channels, which convolve the data signals and must be
compensated at receivers. Among all wireless channels, the ones experienced by high-speed com-
munication systems in mobile environments are most interested in this thesis and called mobile
broadband channels.
Estimating mobile broadband channels is very challenging, because they have large delay
spread and Doppler spread, and vary drastically in both time-domain and frequency-domain. To
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capture channel variances in both domains simultaneously, channel estimators have to adopt two-
dimensional channel models which contain too many parameters and cannot be estimated directly.
Although various methods are proposed to simplify two-dimensional channel models, they con-
sider general applications and suffer from large modelling error. In this thesis, we propose a novel
channel estimation algorithm with the name piece-wise time-invariant approximation (PITIA) [1],
which is dedicated for specific mobile broadband channels - the high-speed train (HST) channels,
and uses the unique features of HST channels to enhance performance.
On the flip side, mobile broadband channels can also be harnessed by communication systems.
The main motivation for overcoming the challenges of RF signal propagation characteristics de-
scribed above is that mobile users can exchange data over very large coverage areas. This same
property also introduces privacy and security concerns, because the transmitted signal is directly
available to all receivers including legitimate users and eavesdroppers, and the capability for high
speed data transaction over a large coverage area exacerbates these concerns. As eavesdroppers
face the same obstacle of channel estimation as legitimate users do, the characteristics of mobile
broadband channels complicate eavesdropping and may enhance information security.
Mobile broadband channels are able to secure confidential information much better than other
channels do, since the former ones vary much faster over time, frequency and space, and contain
significantly larger amount of randomness which is crucial for information security. Moreover,
such randomness exists in nature, while that in conventional security systems is generated arti-
ficially and need to be secured cryptographically. The ever-increasing computation power and
enhanced mathematical theories may break conventional security systems, but cannot guess the
randomness in mobile broadband channels. These unique features provide great opportunities for
security systems. While most related works focus on key generation through wireless channels, this
thesis studies non-cryptographic challenge-response authentication which has not been touched in
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academy before, and devises a novel system named PHY-CRAM [2]. In this system, shared keys
exchanged by legitimate users during authentication are secured directly by the channel, and the
feasibility of this mechanism is validated by prototyping and extensive real-world experiments.
In short, this thesis discusses both challenges and opportunities of mobile broadband channels.
The challenges are addressed by PITIA which estimates HST channels with improved accuracy
compared with conventional methods, while the opportunities are leveraged by PHY-CRAM which
is the first non-cryptographic challenge-response authentication mechanism.
1.2 Contributions, Novelties and Significances
1.2.1 Addressing the challenges
In high-mobility environments such as HST environments, Doppler effect becomes a dominant
challenge for mobile broadband systems, and the reasons are given below. Conventional single-
carrier modulation schemes in wireless/mobile environments can only offer a few Mbps bandwidth
which is insufficient for broadband applications, and must be replaced by orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) [3]. However, OFDM is designed for quasi-static environments
where wireless channels are time-invariant, while mobile broadband systems experience serious
Doppler effect and time-varying effect especially when users travel very fast. Consequently, con-
ventional OFDM systems suffer from very high noise-floor in mobile broadband channels, and the
symbol error rates (SER’s) at OFDM receivers approach a constant high value no matter how high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is. Specifically, when normalized Doppler spread equals to 0.064, the
best SER achieved by a conventional OFDM receiver is only 0.08 [4], which is unacceptable for
most applications even with channel coding.
The prevailing technique to estimate time-varying channels is called basis expansion model
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(BEM), which approximates the channels by a series of basis functions and reconstructs them by
BEM coefficients. This way, estimating a time-varying channel is equivalent to estimating BEM
coefficients. Being different from BEM, PITIA approximates the time-varying channel by a series
of time-invariant channels, and is more suitable for HST channels which usually have large Doppler
spread, small delay spread and high SNR.
PITIA outperforms BEM by 5-8 dB with respect to estimation error in HST channels, and has
low computational complexity. The main reason for this improvement is that, PITIA considers the
unique features of HST channels and reduces the number of parameters to model them, while less
parameters lead to less estimation error according to estimation theories [5]. To achieve satisfactory
modelling error, a L-tap HST channel is modelled by only 2L parameters in PITIA, i.e., L complex
gains (linear parameters) and L Doppler shifts (non-linear parameters), compared with at least
3L parameters in BEM. Some existing channel estimation algorithms [6] [7] also adopt the same
non-linear channel model as the one used by PITIA, but since estimating non-linear parameters
(Doppler shifts) is very hard, their computational efforts are prohibitively large. PITIA models
HST channels with the least channel parameters, decouples the FSF and time-varying effect in
HST channels for the first time, and is the simplest one among all algorithms that estimate Doppler
shifts directly.
1.2.2 Leveraging the opportunities
Two features of mobile broadband channels are favoured by information security: (1) channel
responses at different times, locations and frequencies are random and uncorrelated; (2) channel
responses are reciprocal (or symmetrical) in both directions, i.e., channel responses from A to B
and from B to A at the same time are exactly the same. The randomness and reciprocal property
have potential to achieve a high level of privacy, since such randomness exists in nature and can
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be perceived only by legitimate users, while attackers reside at different locations and perceive
different channel responses. The amount of randomness, quantified by entropy, is proportional to
multipath delay spread στ, channel bandwidth B, relative velocity v between legitimate users, and
time span. For example, if στ = 0.2μs, B = 10MHz, v = 110km/h and central frequency equals to
5.9 GHz, the overall entropy during one second is about 66,000 bits, which is huge compared with
the lengths of secret keys in most cryptographic security protocols.
Researchers have used the randomness and reciprocal property of mobile broadband channels
to enhance or replace cryptographic protocols, such as message authentication [8, 9] and key ex-
change protocols [10–13]. Being different from them, we propose a novel authentication mecha-
nism named PHY-CRAM, where legitimate users do not transmit any pilots or reference signals
for channel estimation, but cancel the effect of channels by an reciprocal operation. In this way,
legitimate receivers can decode the secret information while eavesdroppers get nothing.
Contributions of PHY-CRAM are two-fold: (1) it is the first non-cryptographic challenge-
response user authentication mechanism in the literature; (2) it is the first OFDM system that
uses reciprocal operation to eliminate channel estimation. Due to the first contribution, PHY-
CRAM does not need to increase its key length in order to maintain the same security strength if
the attacker’s computational power is increased, while conventional authentication schemes (such
as CRAM-MD5 [14] and CHAP [15]) must increase key lengths in this case. Longer keys usu-
ally imply more computation overhead, energy consumption and storage overhead, which are not
desirable in resource constrained networks, such as wireless sensor networks. Moreover, the recip-
rocal operation in the second contribution eliminates channel estimation, prevents attackers from
probing the channel, and increases security strength.
The significance of PHY-CRAM is further enhanced by field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
based prototyping and real-world experiments. FPGA provides us with two benefits: (1) it reduces
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processing delay and maintains the channel’s reciprocal property; (2) it is very close to an ASIC
(application specific integrated circuit) in a commercial device, and makes the experimental results
more convening. The one-way processing delay in our prototype is only 40μs during which the
reciprocal property of mobile broadband channels is well maintained, and PHY-CRAM maintains
a high level of confidentiality during authentication according to the real-world experiments.
1.2.3 Publications related to this thesis
PITIA is presented in part in [16], and its journal version is in the final revision stage [17]. PHY-
CRAM is published in [2], and is enhanced in [18] to cover multi-hop networks. Moreover, the
hardware/software platform which prototypes PHY-CRAM is based on the work presented in [19],
and is also used by our research works on cognitive radios [20, 21].
1.3 Related works
1.3.1 Basic channel estimation algorithms for OFDM
Basic channel estimation algorithms for OFDM assume that the channel response is constant over
the entire OFDM block (also called OFDM symbol). Such channel has the name time-invariant
channel (with the implication that there exists frequency-selective fading), and is synonymous
with frequency-selective fading (FSF) channel throughout this thesis. Although these algorithms
cannot be used to estimate HST channels, they are the foundation of advanced channel estimation
algorithms including PITIA.
Existing algorithms for FSF channel estimation can be grouped into two types: blind (or semi-
blind) estimation algorithms [22–26] and pilot-aided ones [27–37]. Some blind estimation algo-
rithms [22, 23] first calculate the covariance matrix of the received signal for each OFDM block,
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and then derive the channel impulse response (CIR) through singular value decomposition (SVD)
of this covariance matrix. Another set of (semi-)blind estimation methods conduct channel estima-
tion and data symbol detection iteratively or jointly [24] [25], and are called EM-type estimator.
Some EM-type estimators are semi-blind because they need knowledges about the channel re-
sponses in initial stages, which can be derived from the pilots only at the beginnings of all frames.
Afterwards, EM-type estimator is merged into Turbo decoder for Turbo-coded OFDM systems to
further enhance the bit error rate (BER) performance [26].
Since most blind estimators suffer from high complexity, practical OFDM systems rely on pilots
(also called reference signals) for channel estimation. Among these pilots-aided channel estima-
tion algorithms, minimum mean square error (MMSE) [27,28,30], maximum likelihood (ML) [29]
and lease squares (LS) [30] estimators are the most famous ones, and they are all derived from sta-
tistical signal processing theories [5]. MMSE estimator has the best performance with the highest
complexity among all algorithms, since it utilizes both SNR and a priori information about the
correlation of channel responses on adjacent subcarriers. Derivation of channel correlation is not
as simple as SNR, and is discussed in [32, 33]. Although MMSE estimator reaches a certain
degree of optimality, it considers all subcarriers as a whole and requires either matrix inverse oper-
ation or pre-known pilots at all subcarriers, both of which may not be realistic in practical OFDM
systems. A simplified version of MMSE estimator named LMMSE (linear MMSE) estimator is
proposed in [28], which derives rough channel estimates with LS estimator first and then corrects
them. LMMSE replaces matrix inverse with matrix multiplication, which is simpler but still too
computationally demanding for embedded devices. To further reduce complexity, the channel re-
sponse on each pilot subcarrier can be estimated one by one [34]. This method utilizes neither
SNR nor frequency-domain correlation of the channel, and is classified as LS or zero-forcing (ZF)
estimator. The channel responses on data subcarriers can be derived from various interpolators,
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like the linear interpolator [35], polynomial interpolator [28], MMSE interpolator [34] or some
other ones [36, 37]. Furthermore, recovered data symbols can also be used for channel estimation
for the next OFDM block or iteratively for current OFDM block, generating the decision-directed
estimators [25, 38].
Channel parameters in PITIA are estimated by LS estimator which can effectively resist noise
with low computational complexity. Although LS estimator is designed for linear systems, PITIA
uses it to estimate non-linear parameters - Doppler shifts, and such usage is rarely found in the
literature. PHY-CRAM does not use any estimator since channel estimation is eliminated.
1.3.2 Time-varying channel estimation
The wireless channel whose response varies during each OFDM block is called time-varying chan-
nel (with the implication that there exists frequency-selective fading), and is synonymous with
double-selective fading (DSF) channel throughout the thesis. Existing time-varying channel esti-
mators are built upon general time-varying channel models, while PITIA is built upon a specific
model for HST channels.
OFDM systems exposed to time-varying channels suffer from inter-carrier interferences (ICI’s),
which is the cause of noise floor and calls for advanced remedies [39, 40]. In early works, ICI’s
are cancelled by diversity over subcarriers [41–43] and estimated by grouped pilots on continuous
subcarriers [44], both with very low spectrum efficiency. Since ICI’s come from the sidelobes of
adjacent subcarriers, a Hanning windowing (instead of a rectangular window) used by the pulse
shaping filter reduces ICIs significantly [45], but also increases the complexity greatly, since the
fast Fourier transform (FFT) operation can no longer be used to simplify OFDM modulation. The
windowing and diversity methods are combined and generalized in [46], with the same issue of
low spectrum efficiency.
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Most ICI cancellation/mitigation methods adopt multi-tap frequency-domain equalizers instead
of the one-tap equalizers for time-invariant channels. Estimating the weights of all taps on all
subcarriers is challenging, since these weights form a two-dimensional matrix with too many pa-
rameters to estimate [47]. In other words, a non-diagonal channel matrix can fully describe the
time-varying channel [48], and if this channel matrix can be estimated, the unknown data at the
transmitter can be derived from matrix inverse operation. This idea is realized in [49], where a
time-domain reference signal is transmitted periodically to facilitate channel matrix estimation;
however, very few OFDM systems have this kind of reference signal.
Another famous ICI cancellation method is called minimum-mean-squared error with succes-
sive interference cancellation (SIC) scheme (MMSE-SIC), which makes decision on the value
of the strongest symbol in current loop and nulls its waveform based on the decision iteratively
[50, 51]. However, this method suffers from the error propagation issue that, a wrong decision in
one symbol affects the decisions of many other symbols. In order to solve this problem, [52] adds
a Turbo decoder in the receiver with a penalty of much higher complexity. A similar work is found
in [52], where the EM-type channel estimation algorithm is combined with MMSE-SIC.
Recent works in time-varying channel estimation (TVCE) model the time-varying channel as
h(t,τ) where t and τ denote time and channel dispersion, respectively. Some algorithms focus on
the estimation of h(t,τ) [53–67], while others are devoted to designing low-complexity channel
equalizers when h(t,τ) has been estimated [68, 69]. In this thesis, we focus on the first problem -
estimation of h(t,τ).
The two-dimensional channel model h(t,τ) contains too many parameters and must be sim-
plified to facilitate TVCE. For examples, h(t,τ) is approximated by linear functions in [70] and
by polynomials in in [65]. The first model has smaller number of channel parameters and better
ability to resist noises, but suffers from larger modelling error, while the latter one shows opposite
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properties. PITIA achieves a better balance between modelling error and the ability to resist noise,
compared to these two techniques.
BEM is widely adopted to simplify time-varying channels, and TVCE downgrades to the es-
timation of BEM coefficients. In [58], LS and LMMSE estimators are used to estimate BEM
coefficients through a group of clustered pilots. For OFDM systems without pilots, blind esti-
mation methods are proposed in [66] with very high computational complexity. Moreover, BEM
coefficients can also be estimated through superimposed training [67].
Proper design on basis functions is crucial for BEM based TVCE algorithms (named BEM
methods hereafter), since these basis functions must model the variance of time-varying chan-
nels precisely, so that the modelling error could be reduced. Various types of basis functions are
proposed, including complex-exponential BEM (CE-BEM) [71], generalized complex-exponential
BEM (GCE-BEM) [53], polynomial BEM (P-BEM) [54], discrete-prolate spheroidal BEM (DPS-
BEM) [55], discrete Legendre polynomial BEM (DLP-BEM) [61, 64] and discrete Karhunen-
Loeve BEM (DKL-BEM) [56] etc. Actually the polynomial channel model in [65] is a special
P-BEM. These models require either a large number of basis functions or preknown channel statis-
tics to keep modelling error small, and require more basis functions when Doppler spread grows.
According to our study, BEM methods require at least 3L channel parameters to model a HST
channel with L resolvable multipath, while PITIA requires only 2L ones with similar modelling
error. Fewer number of parameters to be estimated result in smaller estimation error according to
estimation theories [5].
The proposed algorithm falls into the category of pilot-assisted TVCE algorithms, in which
pilots suffer from interference generated by data symbols. This problem can be mitigated by joint
channel estimation, equalization and data detection algorithms [64, 72]. However, computation
complexity of these algorithms is at least O(N2L) for N subcarriers, which is too high for LTE and
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WiMax systems where N > 1000.
The channel model proposed in this work is similar to the ones adopted in [6] and [7], where the
2L channel parameters are derived from multidimentional minimization algorithms whose compu-
tational complexities are extremely high. Other methods to solve multidimentional minimization
problems also suffer from high complexity, for examples, ML [5], MUSIC [73] and ESPRIT [74].
Compared to these works, PITIA has much lower computation complexity with closed-form ex-
pressions for all estimates.
PITIA is fundamentally different from piece-wise linear approximation (PWLA) [70] although
they have similar names. PITIA assumes that the phase of a channel response at each channel tap
changes linearly over time, while PWLA assumes that the real and imaginary parts of a channel
response are linear. As a result, the channel model in PITIA is non-linear while that in PWLA
is linear. Due to this difference, PITIA shows very small modelling error in the channels with
small delay spread and large Doppler spread, for example, the HST channels, while PWLA is only
applicable in low-mobility environments.
Finally, [75] proposes a TVCE algorithm for HST channels which adopts P-BEM and relies on
block-type pilots embedded in LTE uplink channel, while PITIA favours both block-type pilots
and comb-type pilots. Again, PITIA has fewer number of channel parameters than [75] has.
1.3.3 Physical-layer security
Existing works on physical-layer security can generally be categorized into four types: (1) the ones
based on transceiver hardware differences, i.e., RF fingerprinting [76–78], (2) the ones based on
wireless channels [8, 9, 79–81], (3) physical layer signal watermarking [82, 83] and (4) key gener-
ation from wireless channels [10–13]. None of them study challenge-response user authentication
while PHY-CRAM does.
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(1) RF fingerprinting exploits the transceivers’ hardware impairments to identify different wire-
less devices. Two main approaches for RF fingerprinting are introduced in the literature: transient-
based method [76] and modulation-based method [77]. The former one identifies devices ac-
cording to the transient behaviours of the devices’ amplifiers during the switch from idle state to
transmission state, while the latter one applies the imperfection of modulated signals. It was re-
cently found that RF fingerprinting is vulnerable to impersonation attack [78], while PHY-CRAM
is immune to such attack. To attack the existing RF fingerprinting schemes, an attacker does not
necessarily reproduce a legitimate radio, but only needs to reproduce/replay the signal used for RF
fingerprint verification. Furthermore, measurements on RF fingerprinting are expensive, since they
need high-end signal analysers to extract subtle differences in the signals. Lastly, RF fingerprinting
usually requires a relatively stationary channel condition to accurately extract fingerprints.
(2) Wireless channel based authentication mechanism is based on the fact that the channel
state information (CSI) is location-specific due to path loss and channel fading [8, 9]. In a relative
stable environment, an attacker, whose location is different from the legitimate user’s location, will
present different CSI profile or link signature from the legitimate one. This type of authentication
requires a legitimate user to be authenticated at a specific location, and might not work well in
highly dynamic environments where channel states change drastically over time due to fading or
mobility. The authentication algorithm may need a large number of samples to ensure a desirable
performance, and is also subject to mimicry attacks [84] where an attacker can gain the legitimate
channel information when it is close to the legitimate devices. A recent remedy is proposed to
prevent mimicry attacks, but it requires time synchronization among legitimate parties [81].
Time correlation property of the wireless channels is also exploited to support message authen-
tication in time-varying channels [79, 80]. For example, [75] proposes a physical-layer authenti-
cation algorithm that utilizes channel probing and hypothesis testing to determine whether current
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and prior communication attempts are made by the same transmit terminal. If the time interval
between two frames coming from the same transmitter is smaller than channel coherence time,
CSI [79] or received signal strength (RSS) [80] of these two frames should be highly correlated.
A similar approach based on RSS is proposed in [80]. These authentication mechanisms check
the message authenticity during communication sessions, while they assume that the very first
message (frame) is already authenticated.
PHY-CRAM does not require the legitimate user be at a specific location, and eliminates chan-
nel profile training/probing. Moreover, PHY-CRAM utilizes the randomness in the channels to
hide the shared secret used for authentication, while channel based authentication decides if the
frames are sent from the same channel or not.
(3) Physical layer signal watermarking or fingerprinting is a mechanism to convey a cryp-
tographically secured authentication code/tag along with the primary transmission or message
[82, 83]. General signal watermarking through low-power perturbations of the signal constella-
tion is proposed in [82], with the basic idea that a low-power signal for message authentication is
superimposed on the waveforms carrying data information.
From a methodological point of view, PHY-CRAM is different from signal watermarking since
it does not add any authentication code or tag into the signal. Moreover, PHY-CRAM initializes
a secure communication, while signal watermarking applies to message authentication during the
communication session.
(4) PHY-CRAM is different from physical layer key generation algorithms [10–13] although
they are based on common physical layer foundations (i.e., channel reciprocity, randomness, and
location decorrelation). First, they serve for different purposes, since the former is for authentica-
tion and the latter is for shared key generation. Second, PHY-CRAM exploits the reciprocity to
“decrypt” the shared secret used for authentication, while wireless channel key generation relies on
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the reciprocity to ensure that channel states observed by the two key generation parties are highly
similar. Furthermore, PHY-CRAM does not need to sound the channel explicitly or to reconcile
the key disagreement, and none of the participants knows CSI after authentication. Elimination
of (explicit) channel sounding operation not only simplifies the mechanism, but also increases the





In this chapter, we first introduce OFDM which is adopted as the modulation scheme for most
mobile broadband systems. Then channel models and problem definitions are introduced in section
2.2 and section 2.3, respectively. Finally, the experimental set up and design tools are introduced
in section 2.4.
2.1 Basics of OFDM
An OFDM system divides a frequency-selective fading channel into N narrow-band channels (sub-
carriers) and transmits data symbols over them, so that all data symbols experience flat fading
channels which can be easily estimated and compensated.
The block diagram of OFDM system is shown in figure 2.1. At the transmitter, binary data to be
transmitted are first mapped to symbols according to a certain constellation, for examples, binary
phase-shift keying (BPSK) and quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK). Then pilots and nulls are
mixed with data symbols for channel estimation and spectrum control, respectively. Next, inverse
discrete Fourier transformation (IDFT) is conducted over all symbols, and a cyclic prefix (CP) is
inserted at the beginning of the output signal x to overcome multipath. When the length of CP
is larger than the maximum delay spread of multipath, adjacent OFDM symbols (IDFT blocks)
are separated by CP and immune from inter-symbol-interference (ISI). The final baseband signal
samples are denoted as x̃, which are sent to digital-to-analogue converter (DAC) and RF front-end
for transmission. At the receiver side, timing and frequency synchronization are first achieved
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Figure 2.1: The block diagram of an OFDM system
through CP and synchronization header. Then discrete Fourier transformation (DFT) is conducted
over received signal samples within appropriate time window, which is also called observation
window and should just cover a single OFDM block. Finally, channel estimation and equalization
are conducted after DFT, and binary data are recovered.
According to the analysis above, x = F−1X where F denotes the N×N Vandermonde matrix in
which the jth element at the ith line equals to ωi j with ω := exp(−2πi/N).
2.2 Channel Models for Mobile Broadband Systems
The wireless channels in mobile broadband systems have two major characteristics: frequency-
selective fading (FSF) and time-varying effect.
FSF arises when the root mean squared (RMS) delay spread of multipath, denoted as στ, is
much larger than the duration of a data symbol. This situation usually happens when the data rate is
very high (so that symbol duration is short), as the case in broadband systems. Frequency-domain
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analysis is widely used in broadband systems, and we consider a channel as FSF when channel
bandwidth B is larger than coherence bandwidth BC, which is approximated by 1/(5στ) [86]. For
example, when Long Term Evolution (LTE) operates in open area, στ ≈ 0.5μs, BC ≈ 400 kHz
while B = 20 MHz; therefore, the LTE system experiences serious FSF. OFDM introduced in
the previous section is the best technique to overcome FSF so far, and is adopted by almost all
broadband systems including LTE.
The time-varying effect of a wireless channel is caused by Doppler effect which happens in
high-mobility environments. Doppler effect both shifts a signal’s spectrum in frequency-domain
and rotates a signal’s phase in time domain, and cannot be compensated easily in multipath envi-
ronments since Doppler shifts on different multipath components may be different. Time-varying
effect is usually studied in time-domain, and we consider a channel as time-varying when the
observation window (DFT window for OFDM) for channel estimation is comparable to chan-
nel coherence time TC, which can be approximated by 0.423/ fd where fd denotes the maximum
Doppler shift. For example, when LTE operates on a high-speed train, fd may be as big as 1 kHz,
TC ≈ 423μs, and the observation window equals to the duration of one OFDM symbol which is 70
μs. Therefore, this HST channel is considered as time-varying when LTE is adopted. On the flip
side, when a Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) [87] system operates in urban area,
TC is at the level of mini-second [88], while observation window (or duration of one OFDM sym-
bol) is only 8 μs. As a result, DSRC channel is considered as time-invariant by channel estimators.
Note that time-invariant channels in mobile environments also vary over time.
A wireless channel exhibiting both FSF and time-varying effect has the name double-selective
fading (DSF) channel which is very hard to estimate, and the HST channel falls into this category
according to the analysis above. On the flip side, a DSRC channel exhibits only FSF and we call it
FSF channel, which can be easily estimated [89].
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2.2.1 The DSF channel
The DSF channel is modelled by h(t,τ) where t and τ denote time and channel dispersion, re-
spectively. It has a digitized version gn,m, where n and m denote time index and channel tap
index respectively, with 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 and 0 ≤ m ≤ L− 1. Here N represents the number of
samples in observation window, and L denotes the number of multipath components. Define
x(k) := [x0(k), ...,xN−1(k)]T as the time-domain samples within the kth OFDM block at the trans-
mitter, and x̃(k) := [xN−L(k), ...,xN−1(k),x(k)T ]T as the transmitter’s final output with CP. We will
drop index (k) when necessary. By assuming that the receiver is synchronized to the first path of
signal x0 and CP is disregarded, the received signal y := [y0, ...,yN−1]T is given by
y = Gx+n (2.1)




g0,0 0 ... 0 g0,L−1 ... g0,1
...
gL−2,L−2 ... gL−2,0 0 ... 0 gL−2,L−1
gL−1,L−1 ... gL−1,0 0 ... 0
0 ... ... ...




Here, 2.2 is the time-varying channel model which is well-accepted by the literature.
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2.2.2 The FSF channel
In a FSF channel, an OFDM system can be considered as the superposition of N independent
narrow band subsystems that experience flat-fading channels, and each subsystem is modelled
simply by
Yn = HnXn +Wn,n = 0, ...,N−1 (2.3)
where Yn and Xn denote the frequency-domain symbols at the receiver and the transmitter, re-
spectively, Wn the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), and Hn the frequency-domain channel
response, all at subcarrier n. Here Xn is also the nth element in X.
2.2.3 Discussions
While the models for a DSF channel and a FSF channel appear quite different, they share a funda-
mental theoretical connection. To show this, we concatenate Yn, Xn and Wn for n = 0, ...,N−1 into
vectors Y, X and W, and rewrite 2.3 in a matrix format:
Y = HX+W (2.4)
where H is a diagonal matrix with Hn as its nth element on the main diagonal.
Meanwhile, 2.1 can be formatted as
Fy = Y = FGF−1X+Fn (2.5)
and obviously Fn = W. As a result, both channels may use the same channel Y = HX+W, where
H is a diagonal matrix for FSF channel, and H = FGF−1 for DSF channel. One may verify that, if
the channel is time-varying, i.e., gm,k = gn,k when m = k, FGF−1 is a non-diagonal matrix whose
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non-zero elements surround the main diagonal. On the flip side, when the channel is time-invariant,
gm,k = gn,k for any 0≤m < N and 0≤ k < L, and interestingly, FGF−1 becomes a diagonal matrix,
and 2.4 is equivalent to 2.5.
2.3 Problem Definition
We first focus on the DSF channel modelled in 2.1. In each OFDM symbol, the channel matrix G
has NL non-zero elements, while there are only N observations since the received signal y is with
length N. Unfortunately, conventional estimators like LS and LMMSE require that the observations
are more than the parameters to be estimated [5], which is not the case at here. Moreover, x = F−1X
may not be fully known by the receiver, since X may contains both data and pilots. Last but not the
least, mobile broadband applications run on embedded devices and cannot afford computationally
demanding channel estimation algorithms.
Problem 1: Given the model in 2.1 with x = F−1X where X is partially or fully known by the
receiver, find out an estimate to G, denoted as Ĝ, which is accurate enough to recover all the data
with affordable computation complexity for embedded devices.
Next, we notice that the FSF channel model 2.3 is very simple and can be easily estimated.
However, the frequency-domain channel response Hn is random and only perceivable by the re-
ceiver. This fact can be leveraged to enhance information security.
Problem 2: Given the model in 2.3, design a mechanism to enhance information security utiliz-
ing the random value Hn.
Problem 1 falls into the research area of TVCE, while Problem 2 belongs to physical-layer
security. These two problems represent the negative side and positive side of the same physical
phenomenon - the mobile broadband channel. In Problem 1 we mainly focus on the application of
a LTE system running on a HST. Problem 2 finds its applications in general mobile and wireless
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systems, and is extremely interested in vehicular and ad hoc network (VANET) like DSRC, where
channel responses change drastically over time and frequency, but the channel response during one
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Figure 2.2: The block diagram of a LTE simulator developed to evaluate the performance of PITIA
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Figure 2.3: The photo of the FPGA-based prototype for PHY-CRAM
2.4 Research Methods
2.4.1 The research method for Problem 1
Problem 1 looks like a pure mathematical problem, but it’s closely related to the physical properties
of mobile broadband channels, because current statistical signal processing theories cannot directly
solve equation 2.1 where unknown parameters are more than observations. Instead, researchers
first examine the stochastic properties of channel model G through extensive channel measurement
campaigns, then try to approximate G by simpler models where the number of unknown parameters
is much less than N and estimate G. This is the prevailing research method for TVCE, and has
four major steps: (1) channel measurements; (2) channel modelling; (3) parameter estimation; and
(4) performance evaluation.
Step (1) is time consuming and expensive. Fortunately, there are already lots of such works,
and their outcomes are collected by an empirical channel model named WINNER II [91], which is
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adopted by 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as a standard evaluation tool for LTE chan-
nels. WINNER II provides a set of Matlab programs that generate time-domain channel responses
(the matrix G) with given conditions, for examples, speed of mobile terminal, channel type (urban,
rural or hilly), frequency band, bandwidth, and antenna gains. It covers the HST scenario which is
the focus of this thesis.
With the channel responses generated by WINNER II, we study the specific characteristics of
HST channels, find out a mathematical model that describes G with fewer parameters than those
in conventional models, and propose a novel algorithm PITIA to estimate these parameters.
Similar to most research works on channel estimation, the performances of PITIA are evaluated
by computer based simulations. To this end, we design a set of Matlab programs (a LTE simulator)
to study LTE’s physical-layer according to 3GPP specification [92], as shown in figure 2.2. The
wireless channel is simulated by WINNER II as described above, and channel estimation is con-
ducted by both BEM methods and PITIA for performance comparison. We focus on the physical
downlink shared channel (PDSCH) which is the major data pipe for broadband access, and only
consider the single-antenna case.
2.4.2 The research method for Problem 2
To address Problem 2, we propose a novel challenge-response user authentication mechanism
named PHY-CRAM, which is built upon OFDM and adopts the FSF channel model 2.3. We
both develop a Matlab simulation program and design a hardware prototype to evaluate PHY-
CRAM’s performance, which is characterized by successful authentication rate β (the rate that a
legitimate user passes authentication) and false acceptance rate α (the rate that an attacker passes
authentication).
In simulations, we follow DSRC’s physical-layer specification [87], and adopt a FSF channel
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model [93] with rural and urban scenarios. Two legitimate users are assumed to share a set of
secret keys, while two attackers who do not have these keys pretend to be one of them and conduct
authentication with the counterpart. Under this scenario, we derive α and β under different SNR
and channel conditions.
Performance of PHY-CRAM is determined by not only the coherence time and coherence band-
width of mobile broad channels, but also the processing delay, since PHY-CRAM utilizes the chan-
nel’s reciprocity which is valid only in a very short period. Therefore, we develop a FPGA-based
prototype for PHY-CRAM to ensure low processing delay, and conduct extensive real-world ex-
periments. The RF front end is designed by discrete RF components, and the whole prototype is
put on a cart to support mobility, as shown in figure 2.3. The FPGA together with RF front end
serve as a software-defined radio (SDR) that is also used for many other research works . Two sets
of the prototype perform as legitimate users, while another two sets perform as a naive attacker and
a smart attacker, respectively. Data frames for authentication are generated by FPGA at transmit-
ters, while the baseband I/Q signals at receivers are captured by an oscilloscope. These I/Q signal
samples are then copied to a computer which runs a Matlab program to get α and β. The Matlab
simulation program, which is a float-point program by default, is converted to a fixed-point one
and serves as the golden reference for FPGA design.
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CHAPTER 3
Channel Estimation in HST Environments
3.1 Overview
With the rapid deployment of HST’s around the world and development of intelligent transporta-
tion systems, providing broadband wireless communications between a HST and infrastructure is
becoming indispensable to support various attractive services, such as Internet access, on-board
data services, and multimedia advertisements, etc [94, 95]. The most prospective solutions for
the broadband communication are Long Term Evolution (LTE) [92] and Worldwide Interoperabil-
ity for Microwave Access (WiMax) [96], which adopt OFDM due to its immunity to multipath,
especially when the communication range is long. However, the high-mobility feature of HST’s
introduces DSF channel which is very hard to estimate.
Since FSF is inevitable in broadband OFDM systems, a HST channel is considered as a DSF
channel when Doppler spread is comparable to subcarrier spacing. As an example, in a LTE system
which will be equipped on HST’s in many countries [97, 98], subcarrier spacing is 15 kHz while
Doppler spread is 0.84 kHz when the travelling speed of the HST is 350 km/h; therefore, the HST
channel is considered as time-varying by this LTE system. It is well-known that, time-varying
channels cause ICI’s in OFDM systems and increase the noise floor if a traditional single-tap
channel equalizer is adopted [99].
Time-varying channels contain much more parameters than those of time-invariant channel.
When an OFDM system with N subcarriers runs in a time-varying channel with L taps (L resolv-
25
able multipath components), the general time-varying channel matrix G contains NL unknown
parameters, which is much more than the observations at the receiver (at most N +L observations
for each OFDM symbol). This challenge is formulated as Problem 1 in chapter 2. Reducing the
number of channel parameters is essential for TVCE, but is also risky since fewer parameters often
lead to larger modelling error. To address this issue, we use the specific features of HST channels
to reduce the number of channel parameters, which are then estimated by a novel algorithm named
PITIA.
The most important feature of HST channels is that, there exists only one Doppler shift on each
resolvable multipath component in most cases, and this fact is validated by WINNER II channel
model. Motivated by this finding and the necessity to reduce the number of channel parameters, we
propose a novel TVCE algorithm for HST channels based on this simplified channel model. The
major challenge introduced by this channel model is to estimate non-linear parameters - Doppler
shifts. To this end, we approximate the channel by a bunch of time-invariant channels whose CIR’s
can be estimated through pilots, and name this technique as PIece-wise Time-Invariant Approxi-
mation (PITIA). Then the variations of these CIR’s derive both Doppler shifts and complex channel
gains for all channel taps, from which h(t,τ) is reconstructed. In other words, PITIA decouples
FSF and time-varying effect in HST channels and estimates them in two separate steps, each with
very simple operations. The computational complexity of PITIA is O(NL) which is affordable for
most OFDM receivers.
Since PITIA reduces the number of channel parameters without increasing modelling error,
the proposed algorithm is expected to get better performance, and this expectation is validated
by our LTE simulator. Specifically, PITIA’s performance is better than and comparable to the
performances of typical BEM methods [58] in high SNR regime and low SNR regime, respectively,
while LTE channels have clear line-of-sight (LOS) and enjoy high SNR most of time. Although
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the proposed algorithm is designed for HST channels, it is also suitable for other applications with
the following three channel characteristics: short delay spread, large Doppler spread, and only one
Doppler shift on each resolvable multipath component.
3.2 The HST Channel Model
The wireless channel between the infrastructure and a HST is a typical time-varying channel given
in (2.1) with specific characteristics. Based on the field testing and channel models found in the
literature, we customize the general time-varying channel model for HST channels, and set up the
foundation for PITIA.
The measurement campaigns reported in [97] show that, HST channels at 2.1 GHz frequency
band have very small root-mean-squared (RMS) delay spread, typically smaller than half microsec-
ond. Consequently, L = 16 is large enough in the model given in section 2, when baseband sam-
pling rate is 30.72 MHz according to LTE specifications. This is due to the fact that, most HST
systems operate in rural or open areas. When a HST reaches a city with an urban channel, it slows
down and becomes a normal-speed train; as a result, the “time-varying channel" degrades to a
time-invariant channel. The hilly channel is an exceptional case, where the train travels along a big
mountain, travelling velocity is very high and delay spread is large. We focus on the HST channels
in open and rural areas where L is small, while considering the hilly channel as future works.
We further evaluate the features of HST channels through WINNER II channel model. This
channel model not only validates the fact of small delay spread, but also reveals a very important
characteristic that, there exists only one Doppler shift on most channel taps. To show this feature,
we generate gn,m for n = 0, ...,2047 and m = 0, ...,14 using the simulation code provided by WIN-
NER II channel model with HST scenario, and examine the phase changes on each channel tap
(indexed by m).
27
Figure 3.1 shows a snapshot of gn,m’s phases, which change linearly over m. Since the slope
of phase changes denotes Doppler shift, a constant slope means that there is only one Doppler
shift. This characteristic can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the wireless channels in open
and rural areas contain limited number of multipath components, and there is very little chance
that multiple multipath components fall into the same channel tap. Secondly, in case that some
multipath components collide with each other, they likely come from the reflectors located close to
each other and suffer from similar Doppler shifts. When several multipath components have equal
time delay and similar Doppler shifts, they can be considered as a single but stronger multipath
component.
With this feature, there is no need to identify the wireless channel’s Doppler spectrum, for
example, the bell-shaped Doppler spectrum predicted by Jakes model [100]; instead, the time-
varying channel can be represented by the following simple model
gn,m = gme j2πδmn/N (3.1)
where gm := g0,m denotes the complex channel gain at time index 0, and δm denotes the normalized
Doppler shift with respect to BS, i.e., Δ fm/BS where Δ fm denotes the Doppler shift in hertz, all for
channel tap m. This channel model shares the same form as the ones adopted in [6, 7], where
the time-varying channel is solely determined by gm and δm for m = 0, ...,L− 1; however, these
algorithms suffer from high complexity due to the nonlinearity of this model. PITIA introduces a
much simpler algorithm to estimate these 2L channel parameters in the next section.
Note that in the channel model (3.1), the delay of each multipath component is represented by
index m implicitly. When channel tap m1 contains a multipath component, gm1 is a non-zero value;





Figure 3.1: Phases of the time-varying channel response on channel taps 1 to 8 derived from WIN-
NER II channel model; x-coordinate denotes n while y-coordinate denotes the phase of g(n,m) for
a given number of m
.
is defined as 0 too, as shown in figure 3.1.
Given the channel model in (3.1), estimating a time-varying channel is equivalent to estimating
2L parameters gm and δm for m = 0, ...,L−1. As a comparison, BEM methods model the channel
by L(Q+ 1) parameters where (Q+ 1) denotes the number of basis functions. Note that Q is
mainly determined by fM, instead of the number of distinguished Doppler shifts in each multipath
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component. In HST channels where fM is high, Q is usually larger than 1. As a result, the number
of channel parameters in BEM methods is larger than 2L. Moreover, for a linear system with fixed
number of observations, fewer parameters lead to better NMSE performance [5]. Therefore, the
proposed channel estimation algorithm based on a simplified channel model customized for HST
channels is expected to outperform BEM methods.
3.3 The Proposed Algorithm
3.3.1 Piece-wise time-invariant approximation
PITIA is inspired by the specific features of HST channels. Consider the channel model (3.1)
where Doppler shifts δm for all m dominate the time-varying characteristic of the wireless channel.
Note that δm ≤ fM and in most practical OFDM systems the normalized Doppler shift with respect
to subcarrier spacing fM < 0.1. As an example, fM equals to 0.064 in a LTE system operating at
2.6 GHz (which is the highest frequency band allocated for LTE in Europe and Asia) on a HST
with travelling speed 400 km/h. Moreover, the maximum delay spread L is in the order of 0.1N for
most practical systems, and is in the order of 0.01N in HST channel according to the analysis in
subsection 3.2 (considering that N = 2048 according to LTE specification, and L = 16). Therefore,
phase changes caused by Doppler shifts during time span L, which is 2πδmL/N, is in the order of
1E-3 and can be neglected. This property serves as the foundation of PITIA.
In order to utilize this property, G is partitioned into N/LK1 matrixes from top to bottom, each
of which has the size LK1×N where K1 = 2K0 where K0 is a positive integer. From (2.1) we have
y(u)=G(u)a+n(u) (3.2)
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where y(u) := [yuLK1 , ...,y(u+1)LK1−1]
T , n(u) := [nuLK1 , ...,n(u+1)LK1−1]




T where Gn denotes the nth row of G, for u = 0, ...,N/LK1−1. Given any
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and make an approximation that gn,m = g(u+1/2)LK1,l for n = uLK1, ...,(u+ 1)LK1− 1 and m =

























Note that (3.4) only holds for u = 1, ...,N/LK1− 1; when u = 0, all the negative indices on a
should be added by N. The physical meaning of (3.4) is that, a time-varying channel over time
period N is approximated by N/LK1 time-invariant channels with CIRs g(u) for u = 0, ...,N/LK1−
1, as shown in figure 3.2. The channel response within time index 0 to LK1−1 is considered to be
constant and approximated by CIR g(0), while channel response within time index LK1 to 2LK1−1
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Figure 3.2: The basic principle of PITIA: the time varying channel gn,m is approximated by a series
of ĝ(u)
.
is again considered to be constant (but may be different from the previous one) and approximated
by CIR g(1), and so on. This technique is called PITIA.
In this technique, LK1 determines the duration of time-invariant channels used to approximate
the time-varying channel. We consider K1 as an important design parameter, since it determines
both modelling error and anti-noise ability. Larger K1 results in larger modelling error and better
anti-noise ability and vice versus. When K1 = N/L, PITIA approximates the time-varying channel
by a single time-invariant channel, and (3.4) downgrades to the conventional channel estimation
algorithms in time-invariant channels. Moreover, K1 must be larger than or equal to 1, so that g(u)
can be estimated by the method below.
If a is known by the receiver, A(u) is also known, and g(u) can be derived from the LS estimator
[5]:
ĝ(u) = ((A(u))HA(u))−1(A(u))Hy(u) (3.5)
where ((A(u))HA(u))−1(A(u))H can be derived offline, and the estimator enjoys low complexity.
The MMSE estimator [5] and LMMSE estimator [28] are not considered to ensure low computation
complexity.
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All the channel parameters gm and δm for m = 0, ...,L− 1 can be derived from ĝ(u), and the
whole time-varying channel G can be reconstructed.
Note that the receiver may not fully know a since it may contain both pilots and data symbols.
To address this issue, we discuss the pilot allocation scheme in the next section, which is followed
by the method to estimate ĝ(u) through pilots.
3.3.2 Pilot allocation schemes
Two different pilot allocation schemes are widely used in pilot assisted OFDM systems: comb-type
and block-type, as shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b) respectively, where solid ellipses and rotundities
denote pilot subcarriers, while circles denote null subcarriers. All blank areas are occupied by data
symbols.
When block-type pilots exist, A(u) is known by the receiver, ĝ(u) in pilot blocks can be derived
from (3.5) directly, and ĝ(u) in data blocks can be derived from interpolation. However, when
comb-type pilots are adopted, A(u) cannot be derived directly, and this situation is further discussed
below.
We denote the distance between two adjacent combs, the width of each pilot cluster, and the
width of each null subcarrier group as Nb, Np and Nf , respectively, as shown in figure 3. Moreover,
the number of null subcarriers used for channel estimation at the receiver is denoted as N(R)f , and
usually 0≤ N(R)f ≤ Nf . When Np = 1, the corresponding pilot pattern is referred to as frequency-
domain Kronecker delta (FDKD) [63], as shown in figure 3(c). It is very important to adapt these
three parameters to channel characteristics. In channels with large delay spread and dense mul-
tipath, Nb must be small, while channels with large Doppler spread favour large Nf . Moreover,
pilots and null subcarriers should not occupy all subcarriers, i.e., Np +2Nf < Nb. As a result, Nb,
Np and Nf may vary significantly for OFDM systems working in different channel environments.
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Figure 3.3: Comb-type (a), block type (b) and FDKD (c) pilot allocation schemes
HST channels with small delay spread and large Doppler spread favour large Nb and large Nf .
3.3.3 Channel estimation through pilots
Although a is partially known by the receiver, ĝ(u) can still be estimated by the method introduced
in this section, which has been published in [16] in part.
Define ΞV as the set of indices of the subcarriers used for channel estimation. Then the
time-domain pilot signal ap := [b0, ...,bN−1]T is derived from bn = ∑
k∈ΞV




ane− j2πnk/N , or equivalently
ap=F
−1QVFa (3.6)
where F denotes the N×N Vandermonde matrix whose jth element at the ith line equals to ωi j
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0, i f i /∈ ΞV
1, i f i ∈ ΞV
, f or i = 0, ...,N−1.
The matrix F−1QVF serves as a comb-type filter that rejects data symbols and accepts pilots.
Similarly, the time-domain data signal is obtained by
ad = F
−1(IN−QV)Fa (3.7)
Obviously a =ad+ap, and from (2.1) we get
y = G(ad+ap)+n. (3.8)




Define M := F−1QVFGad which is the second term in (3.9) and represents the interference of
data over pilots. From (3.7) we have M = F−1QV(FGF−1)(IN −QV)Fa where FGF−1 denotes
the frequency-domain channel matrix. When Doppler spread equals to 0, FGF−1 is a diagonal
matrix, and M = 0 accordingly. When Doppler spread is non-zero, FGF−1 is close to a diagonal
matrix, the values of whose items diminish rapidly around the main diagonal. Here we consider M
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np := F−1QVFGad +F−1QVFn
:= ep +wp
(3.11)
denotes the sum of noise wp at pilot subcarriers and interference ep coming from data symbols.
The reason for the approximation in (3.10) is that, FGF−1 is close to a diagonal matrix, and for
two diagonal matrices QA and QB, QAQB = QBQA. Adopting the same operations as shown in










where y(u)p := [yp,uLK1 , ...,yp,(u+1)LK1−1]










where yp,m and np,m denote the mth element in yp and np, respectively, and P(u) is determined
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solely by pilots. Then g(u) can be estimated by
ĝ(u) = ((P(u))HP(u))−1(P(u))Hy(u)p . (3.14)
3.3.4 Channel reconstruction
Let ĝ(u)m denote the mth element in ĝ(u). For a given u, ĝ(u) denotes the L-tap CIR at time index
(u+1/2)LK1, or in other words, the L non-zero elements at the (u+1/2)LK1’th row of matrix G
defined in (2.2). For a given m on the other hand, the function ĝ(u)m over u reveals the variation of
channel tap m over time. These relationships are shown in figure 2.
There are various ways to derive all the channel parameters gm and δm from ĝ
(u)
m , and the whole
channel matrix G can be reconstructed. Since the main purpose of this work is to introduce piece-
wise time-invariant approximation, we only demonstrate a simple and effective method here. Per-
formance improvement may be achieved if more advanced approaches are adopted in future works.
We denote the phase of ĝ(u)m as  ĝ
(u)
m for u = 0,1, ...,N/LK1− 1, and plot a snapshot of these
values derived in a very noisy channel in figure 4. Since these phase shifts are caused by a single
Doppler shift, they can be regressed by a straight line whose slope Vm determines the Doppler shift
δm, and whose start point Qm determines the phase of gm at n = 0. Such linear regression can be
















In (3.15), there is a coefficient 1/LK1 because u at x-coordinate in figure 4 grows LK1 times
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Figure 3.4: Phases of ĝ(u)m for u = 0,1, ...,N/LK1−1; the phase of gm and the Doppler shift δm are
derived from the start point Gm and the slope of the dashed straight line that fits all the data points
with least squares approach, respectively.
faster than n in the channel model (3.1). The amplitude of gm is estimated by averaging the am-
plitudes of ĝ(u)m over u in (3.16), while the phase of gm is estimated by Qm directly. At here, two
parameters δ̂m and ĝm are derived from N/(LK1) values, i.e., ĝ
(u)
m u = 0,1, ...,N/LK1−1, and there
exists much redundancy since both L and K1 are much smaller than N. As a result, the noise is
reduced significantly in this estimation process.
Finally, the time-varying channel response gn,m is estimated by
ĝn,m = ĝme j2πδ̂mn (3.17)
and the channel matrix G can be reconstructed according to (2.2).
Note that the operator  makes the proposed TVCE algorithm non-linear. We will evaluate the
performance of this non-linear operation in section 3.4.
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Figure 3.5: The workflow of PITIA
3.3.5 The overall workflow
The overall workflow of the proposed algorithm is shown in figure 5. Firstly, observations y are
sent to a FFT processor, and symbols on subcarriers allocated for pilots and (part of) nulls are sent
to an IFFT processor, with zeros inserted on data subcarriers. These operations, called step (0),
serve as a comb-type filter that extracts the pilots for channel estimation. The outputs of step (0)
are denoted as yp which derive ĝ(u) as CIR samples of the time-varying channel according to the
estimator (3.14) in step (1). Finally, in step (2), all ĝ(u) for u = 0,1, ...,N/LK1− 1 derive the 2L
channel parameters gm and δm by (3.15) and (3.16), respectively, and the estimated channel matrix
Ĝ can be constructed according to (3.17). We refer to this step as “channel reconstruction”.
We use the term PITIA to represent only step (1) while introducing the proposed algorithm, and
use it to represent the whole algorithm during performance comparison with conventional methods.
3.4 Performance Analysis
The performance of PITIA is determined by various factors which are discussed in this section.
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First of all, the comb-type filter in PITIA cannot completely isolate pilots and data symbols,
and pilots used for channel estimation are interfered by data symbols. This is because the power
of each subcarrier is dispersed over a large frequency band in high-mobility environments. We
model these interference as extra AWGN noise ep in (3.11). This is not an inherent problem of
PITIA, since BEM methods also suffer from the same issue. These interferences may be resisted by
advanced signal processing techniques [58,64,72] regardless of the channel estimation algorithms
(either PITIA or BEM) used. To conduct fair comparison, we assume that BEM methods also treat
these interferences as extra AWGN noise, so that both types of methods have similar computation
complexity.
Secondly, PITIA has an modelling error introduced by the operation to approximate the time-
varying channel during LK1 samples by a time-invariant channel. As shown in the next subsection,
this error is determined by fMLK1. This property is different from that of BEM, whose modelling
error is determined only by fM if basis functions are given. As a result, PITIA is able to reduce
modelling error in channels with small delay spread, and fits HST channels well. We will give the
upper bound of the modelling error in PITIA, and compare it with the PWLA approach [70] and
BEM methods with LS estimator [58].
Finally, the modelling error in step (2) arises when multiple multipath components with distin-
guished Doppler shifts fall into a single channel tap. We ignore this situation in theoretical studies,
but evaluate its effect using WINNER II channel model through simulations. The overall perfor-
mance of PITIA in noisy HST channels is evaluated by the LTE simulator introduced in section
2.4.1, where the ground truth of channel responses are derived from either the channel model from
(3.1) or WINNER II channel model.
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3.4.1 The modelling error of PITIA and BEM
Modelling error refers to the error introduced during channel approximation, and is determined
solely by the method to simplify a time-varying channel rather than SNR. The normalized mod-
elling errors σ2M of both PITIA and BEM with respect to the energy of |gn,m| are evaluated by
theoretical studies and/or simulations in this subsection.
As shown in figure 2, the HST channel gn,m modelled by (3.1) during the time span from uLK1
to (u+1)LK1−1 is approximated by g(u+1/2)LK1,m, for u = 0, ...,N/LK1−1 and m = 0, ...,L−1.









































|gm||e jpm,k,u− e jqm,k,u |2
(3.18)








Lemma 1: When π/2 > |c4− c3| ≥ |c2− c1|, |e jc4− e jc3 |2 ≥ |e jc2− e jc1 |2.
This lemma is simple and we omit the proof for it.
Proposition 1 : The upper bound of σ2M,PIT IA defined in (3.18) is well approximated by (π fMLK1/N)
2.
Proof. For k = 0, ...,LK1−1, |pm,k,u−qm,k,u| ≤ πδmLK1/N ≤ π fMLK1/N. According to the chan-
nel model given in section 2, π fMLK1/N is in the order of 1E-3 and much smaller than π/2.
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It is shown in Proposition 1 that, the modelling error of PITIA is quadratically proportional to
Doppler shift fM, the maximum delay spread L in number of samples, and the design parameter
K1. Therefore, PITIA favours the channels with small L, like HST channels.
The upper bound in Proposition 1 as a function of fM is plotted in figure 6, together with the
modelling errors of PITIA, PWLA, GCE-BEM [53] and DLP-BEM [61] derived by simulations.
For GCE-BEM, Q must be odd and no smaller than 2, while for DLP-BEM proposed in [61], Q= 2
is large enough for most practical OFDM systems. The simulations use the channel model in (3.1)
as ground truth with N = 2048 and L = 16. It is shown that the modelling error of BEM with a
large Q enjoys small modelling error, for example, DLP-BEM with Q = 2 and GCE-BEM with
Q = 4. However, since the number of BEM coefficients equals to L(Q+1), larger Q leads to more
channel parameters, and the estimation performance in noisy environments would be degraded.
PWLA and DLP-BEM with Q = 1 approximate the channel by 2L parameters like PITIA does.
Compared to these two methods, PITIA shows smaller modelling error when K1 = 1. When K1 = 2
and K1 = 4, PITIA outperforms them when fM > 0.02 and fM > 0.04, respectively, as shown in
figure 6. Therefore, K1 controls the balance between the modelling error and the error caused by
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noises and interferences. Smaller K1 leads to smaller modelling error and vice versus, while its
optimal value is evaluated in sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. When Q = 1, DLP-BEM is equivalent to
PWLA which suffers from large modelling error in HST channels with large Doppler shifts. As a
result, DLP-BEM should set Q ≥ 2 in order to estimate HST channels, and the number of BEM
coefficients is equal to or larger than 3L.

































Figure 3.6: Modelling errors of PITIA, piece-wise linear approximation, GCE-BEM and DLP-




As shown in figure 5, PITIA contains three functional blocks: FFT, CIR estimation, and chan-
nel reconstruction through linear regression. The complexity of FFT operation is in the order
of O(Nlog(N)). CIR estimates are derived from (3.5) with complexity O(NL), which is slightly
larger than O(Nlog(N)). The complexity of linear regression is around O(N/K1) and is negligible.
Therefore, the overall complexity of PITIA is at the level of O(NL) which is similar to that of BEM
methods.
3.4.3 The overall performance
The overall performances of PITIA and BEM methods are characterized by normalized mean











where ĝn,m denotes the channel estimates. This expression contains channel modelling error σ2M,
the estimation error σ2NI caused by noise and interference, and extra errors σ2Extra introduced by
error propagation along multiple estimation steps and the non-linear operation to get  ĝ(u)m . In








The definition in (3.20) is equivalent to the definition of interference plus noise to signal ratio
(INSR), or the reciprocal of signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR), if we consider channel
estimates as “signals”. According to [5], for a linear system with No independent observations and
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p variables, the LS estimator enhances the SINR of these p variables by No/p times, or in other
words, reduces the INSR by No/p times, given that the interferences follow Gaussian distribution.
For BEM methods, No equals to the number of subcarriers used for channel estimation, which
equals to the size of ΞV denoted as NV , while p equals to L(Q+ 1). As a result, σ2NI of BEM












where PN := E{wHp wp} denotes the energy of noise, PI := E{eHp ep} the energy of interference and
PS := E{(Gap)HGap} the energy of pilot signals.









where σ2M,BEM and σ2Extra,BEM denote the modelling error and extra noises in BEM methods, re-
spectively.
Similarly, NMSE of PITIA which is denoted as σ2All,PIT IA can also be derived. For example,
the original INSR at the input, which equals to 1/ϒin, is reduced by K1 times in step (1) and by
NV/(2LK1) times in step (2), and changes to 1/(K1ϒin) and 2L/(ϒinNV ), respectively. Moreover,
we consider that the operator  introduces extra noises whose power is proportional to the power
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where C1 is a constant.
3.4.4 Parameter optimization
It is shown in (3.25) that, NMSE of the proposed algorithm contains three items: 1) the estimation
error caused by noises and interferences, 2) the modelling error σ2M and 3) extra errors caused by
error propagation and non-linear operations. Moreover, we consider that SINR ϒin, channel length
L, the number of subcarriers N and the number of pilots NV are determined by the application or
the wireless channel, while K1 is the only design parameter in PITIA.
Obviously, (3.25) as a function of K1 is convex, and there exists a certain value of K1 that
minimizes (3.25), or in other words, maximizes the NMSE performance of PITIA. By setting the
first derivative of (3.25) to 0, this optimal value is obtained by
K∗1 = argminK1
σ2All,PIT IA = (C1/2ϒin)
1/3(N/(π fML))2/3 (3.26)
which shows that larger C1 and smaller maximum Doppler shift fM lead to larger K∗1 . However,
K∗1 is insensitive to these factors due to the exponential operations (·)1/3 and (·)2/3.
3.4.5 Numerical results
We further evaluate K∗1 and NMSE with the simulation tool developed in section 2.4.1, with
N = 2048 and BS = 15kHz as specified in LTE, and L = 16 as analysed in section 3.2. The corre-
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sponding sampling rate over baseband signal is 30.72MHz. QPSK modulation is adopted for both
data and pilots with equal transmission powers. The comb-type pilot pattern as shown in figure
3(a) is adopted, with Nb = 16, Nf = 2 and Np = 3.
The NMSE values as a function of K1 under different SNR and Doppler shift conditions are
plotted in figure 7, where K1 = 2 shows best performance in most cases, while K1 = 4 is slightly
better than K1 = 2 when SNR is low. This result is consistent with (3.26) where smaller SINR
results in larger value of K∗1 . These curves also validate the fact that the optimal design parameter
K∗1 is not sensitive to channel conditions, and PITIA is able to reach optimality with K1 = 2 in most
conditions. As a result, we set K1 = 2 and proceed with two scenarios.
































Figure 3.7: NMSE changes over K1 under different SNR and Doppler shift conditions
In scenario 1, the ground truth of the time-varying channel gn,m is generated by (3.1) which has
a single Doppler shift and a random initial phase evenly distributed over [0,2π] on each multipath
component. Powers of multipath components decay exponentially over channel dispersion with a
1-dB random shadowing factor. Maximum Doppler shift is set to fmax = 841 Hz and fmax = 361
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Figure 3.8: NMSE of the proposed algorithm, piece-wise linear approximation, GCE-BEM and
DLP-BEM, with N = 2048, L = 16 and fmax = 841 Hz; “ground truth" of the wireless channel is
simulated by (3.1).
Hz ( fM = 0.056 and fM = 0.024), respectively, which correspond to a travelling speed of 350
km/h and 150 km/h if carrier frequency equals to 2.6 GHz. It is shown in figures 8 and 9 that, the
proposed algorithm with K1 = 2 outperforms all BEM methods when SNR is higher than 13 dB
and 25 dB when fmax = 841 Hz and fmax = 361 Hz, respectively. In low-SNR regimes, both types
of algorithms have similar performances.
In scenario 2, gn,m is generated by a more realistic channel model - WINNER II channel model
with HST scenario, while other conditions are the same as those in scenario 1. This scenario
differ from the previous one in that, the order of the channel responses in simulations may exceed
16 occasionally, and there may be more than one Doppler shifts on a few multipath components.
Simulations results are plotted in figures 10 and 11, which are similar as those in scenario 1. It
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Figure 3.9: NMSE of the proposed algorithm, piece-wise linear approximation, GCE-BEM and
DLP-BEM, with N = 2048, L = 16 and and fmax = 361 Hz; “ground truth" of the wireless channel
is simulated by (3.1).
is also shown that, the degree of performance enhancement does not vary significantly with the
change of fmax, because fmax in WINNER II channel model is stochastic and we can only define
its mean value. We claim that HST channels are modelled by (3.1) properly, and PITIA works well
when there is occasional mismatch between the assumed channel model (3.1) and the ground truth.
Moreover, these simulation results show consistence with (3.24) and (3.25). First of all, σ2All is
mainly determined by the number of channel parameters and the corresponding channel modelling
error. When Q = 1, modelling errors (i.e., the first term) in (3.24) and (3.25) equal each other, but
σ2M,BEM > σ2M,PIT IA (with K1 = 2 and fM = 0.056/0.024), as shown in subsection 3.4.1. When
Q > 1, σ2M,BEM < σ2M,PIT IA, but the modelling error in (3.24) is larger than that in (3.25). In short,
PITIA achieves a better balance between the number of channel parameters and the modelling
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Figure 3.10: NMSE of the proposed algorithm, piece-wise linear approximation, GCE-BEM and
DLP-BEM, with N = 2048 and L = 16; “ground truth" of the wireless channel is simulated by
WINNER II, and fmax is around 841 Hz.
error, compared with BEM methods. Moreover, the power of extra noises in (3.25) is small when
SNR is high, and performance enhancement is thereby achieved in high SNR regime.
We conclude that PITIA outperforms BEM methods in high-mobility and high-SNR environ-
ments.
3.4.6 Discussions
Simulation results show that, NMSE of PITIA is 1-2 dB lower in low SNR regime, but 5-8 dB
higher in high SNR regime, compared to that of BEM methods. If we model the SNR at receiver
as a random variable distributed evenly over 0 to 40 dB, the proposed algorithm is able to re-
duce the mean value of NMSE significantly. Moreover, as HST’s often operate in rural and open
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Figure 3.11: NMSE of the proposed algorithm, piece-wise linear approximation, GCE-BEM and
DLP-BEM, with N = 2048 and L = 16; “ground truth" of the wireless channel is simulated by
WINNER II, and fmax is around 361 Hz.
environments, they enjoy high SNR most of the time.
PITIA requires that clustered pilots are embedded at the transmitter. This requirement is popular
in existing TVCE algorithms, but is not fulfilled by current LTE systems. We argue that LTE
systems should be enhanced to facilitate TVCE in HST and other high-mobility environments.
3.5 Summary
We propose a simple and effective TVCE algorithm named PITIA to address the challenges intro-
duced by mobile broadband channels. It is based on the finding that there exists only one Doppler
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shift on each resolvable multipath component. It reduces the number of channel parameters to
be estimated while keeping modelling error low, and thereby reduces estimation error. We de-
rive PITIA’s optimal design parameter K1 whose value is stable under various channel conditions.
Moreover, the computation complexity of PITIA is comparable with that of a FFT operation. As a
result, PITIA is suitable for practical OFDM systems on HST’s.
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CHAPTER 4
PHY-CRAM: Harnessing Mobile Broadband Channels
4.1 Overview
With the rapid advancement of wireless communication technology and ever-increasing mobile
applications, securing wireless communication becomes more and more important and challeng-
ing. Compared to a wired network, ensuring security in a wireless/mobile network faces greater
challenges mainly due to its “open air” nature since an attacker can easily eavesdrop or intercept
the wireless communication channel. On the flip side, the inherent and unique properties of mobile
broadband channels can be exploited to enhance the wireless network security. There has been an
increasing interest in complementing or enhancing authentication in wireless networks by exploit-
ing physical layer characteristics [8,9,76–83,101–103]. Physical layer authentication/identification
benefits a number of wireless applications such as forensics [104], identity-based attack detec-
tion [105], access control [106, 107], malfunctioning detection [108], and tracking [109, 110] etc.
In this chapter, we propose the first physical layer challenge-response authentication mechanism
(PHY-CRAM) to leverage the opportunities provided by mobile broadband channels and to address
Problem 2. Being different from encryption based challenge-response authentication techniques,
PHY-CRAM exchanges unencrypted shared secrets among participants. These shared secrets are
masked by a random number and the channel fading, while the verifier is able to verify the secrets
without knowing the channel state information (CSI) owing to a reverse operation in the response
signal and channel reciprocity. An attacker, on the other hand, cannot experience exactly the same
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channel fading as any legitimate user experiences due to location distinction, and can hardly learn
the shared secrets from the signals transmitted from legitimate users.
The security strength of PHY-CRAM depends on the randomness of the fading channel and
the relative geographic location between the attacker and legitimate users, but not depends on the
computation complexity. That is, even when the attacker’s computational power is increased, PHY-
CRAM does not need to increase its key length in order to maintain the same security strength, as
long as the channel randomness is remained. This property is not owned by conventional authen-
tication schemes (such as CRAM-MD5 [14] and CHAP [15]).
PHY-CRAM features another unique characteristic that, it eliminates channel coding, channel
estimation and frequency offset compensation for most messages during the challenge-response
authentication. This feature does not only simplifies the baseband design, but also prevents the
attackers from probing the channel and provides better security strength.
PHY-CRAM is also unique compared to other existing physical layer authentication mecha-
nisms. Being different from the existing RF fingerprinting schemes [76–78,102,103], PHY-CRAM
is immune to impersonation attacks, it does not require a high end signal analyzer, and it favors
dynamic environments. Compared to wireless channel based authentication [8, 9, 79–81, 101], it
does not require the legitimate user to be at a specific location and does not need channel estima-
tion or training. PHY-CRAM is also different from signal watermarking [82,83], which conveys a
cryptographically secure digital signature along with the primary transmission by superposition or
superimposing. In short, PHY-CRAM is simple, secure, robust, and flexible, and can be applied in
any wireless networks for authenticating nodes that share a secret without the requirements of any




We consider a wireless network with I legitimate users Bi, i = 0, ..., I− 1. Node pairs that need
to authenticate each other share a set of secrets. For example, in a wireless local area network
(WLAN), the access point shares different secret keys with each client. Specifically, the shared
keys (bit strings) between B j and Bk are denoted as {X( j,k)j ,X( j,k)k }, where X( j,k)j := [X ( j,k)0, j , ...,X ( j,k)M−1, j]T ,
X ( j,k)m, j ∈ {0,1} (m = 0, ...,M− 1) is the (m+ 1)th bit, and M is the key length. X( j,k)k follows the
same definition. For one-way authentication, only one key is necessary, while for mutual authenti-
cation two keys are used in PHY-CRAM. For simplicity, we drop the index ( j,k) whenever there is
no misunderstanding.
Each legitimate user B j has a Media Access Control (MAC) address, which is equipped in most
MAC protocols. Security of the system relies on the secrecy of {X j,Xk}. If an attacker knowns
{X j,Xk}, it has the ability to impersonate either B j or Bk.
4.2.2 Communication model
A frequency band with bandwidth W is occupied by the wireless network, where the users who
want to authenticate each other are within their communication ranges. We consider a three-layer
communication model: (1) the physical-layer modulation scheme, (2) the MAC protocol, and (3)
the authentication scheme running as an application. PHY-CRAM contributes in (1) and (3), while
adopts conventional MAC protocols, for examples, carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) for ad
hoc networks or time division multiple access (TDMA) for centralized networks.
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) is adopted as the physical layer tech-
nique, since it enjoys high spectrum efficiency and good immunity to multipath, and can utilize
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the reciprocal feature of wireless channels easily. Many modern wireless network standards adopt
OFDM technology, such as 802.11 (WiFi), 802.16 (WiMax), LTE, etc. Users in the network may
be indoor, outdoor, static or mobile, resulting in different channel types. Each channel associates
with a channel coherence time TC, below which the channel is considered as temporally correlated.
Define N and L as the number of subcarriers and length of cyclic prefix (CP) in OFDM modu-
lation, respectively. Then the subcarrier spacing equals to W/N. A proper design on the system
guarantees that N and L are large enough to overcome frequency-selective fading, while N is also
small enough to overcome the Doppler shifts in mobile environments [111].
4.2.3 Attacker model
We assume a very powerful attacker E, who knows all the communication protocols and authen-
tication schemes adopted in the network. Besides, E is able to monitor and replay any messages
and signals sent in the network. E may be very close to a legitimate user, say just one or few
wavelengths away from legitimate users. The radio on E is assumed to be perfect, with no LO drift
or modulation error. However, E does not know {X j,Xk}. E’s goal is to pass the authentication
with legitimate user(s).
4.3 The Physical Layer Mutual Authentication Mechanism: PHY-CRAM
4.3.1 The basics
PHY-CRAM is realized by transmission and reception of a bunch of wireless frames between two
participants. All these frames have (K1 +K2) OFDM symbols. The first K1 symbol is modulated
with differential phase shift keying (DPSK) scheme, and contains binary data regarding the traffic
information and user information, like frame type, MAC address, and time stamp etc (referred to
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Figure 4.1: Frame structure of PHY-CRAM messages
as traffic information). Due to the importance of traffic information, data interleaving, convolu-
tional encoding and cyclic redundancy check (CRC) are adopted. We randomize the amplitude of
each subcarrier since equal power level reveals CSI to the attacker, while CSI is not required to
demodulate DPSK signal.
The last K2 symbols in each frame carry PHY-CRAM information, which contains the shared
keys X j and Xk, as well as a set of random values Dn. PHY-CRAM information may be repeated
for several times to resist noise. For simplicity, we assume that both traffic information and PHY-
CRAM information can be accommodated in a single OFDM symbol (however, PHY-CRAM is
not confined to this condition). As a result, K1 = 1 and K2 equals to the number of repetitions for
PHY-CRAM information, and the corresponding frame structure is shown in figure 4.1.
Note that the DPSK modulation for traffic information does not require at least two OFDM
symbols or an “initial” OFDM symbol with pre-known phase information, since the differential
encoding can be conducted subcarrier-by-subcarrier [112]. Taking DQPSK as an example, the
phase difference between subcarrier 10 and subcarrier 11 carries two bits, while the phase differ-
ence between subcarrier 12 and subcarrier 13 carries another two bits (all these subcarriers are
within one OFDM symbol). Since the subcarrier spacing is designed to be much smaller than the
coherence bandwidth, the channel responses on two adjacent subcarriers are highly correlated. The
phases at subcarriers 10 and 12 may be randomized to further increase the security strength.
The term “frame” may be misunderstood such that it only defines the data at MAC layer, which
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is further encapsulated at physical layer. Actually, all “frames” defined here refer to the final
signal “in the air”. More importantly, these frames do not contain any pre-known synchronization
header, pilots or reference signals. Timing and frequency synchronization to these frames at the
receiver are realized simply through autocorrelation on CP [113]. Throughout the procedure of
PHY-CRAM, channel estimation is never needed.
Based on the communication model given in subsection 4.2.2, Doppler spread caused by relative
speed between two participants are neglected, and there is no inter-carrier interference (ICI) in the
system. As a result, the OFDM system can be considered as the superposition of N independent
narrow band subsystems that experience flat-fading channels, and each subsystem is modelled
simply by 2.1. Due to its simplicity, frequency-domain representation is used throughout this
chapter.
Without loss of generality, we map the M-length shared key X j or Xk onto the subset of sub-
carriers with M smallest indices; for example, X0, j is mapped onto subcarrier 0, and XM−1, j onto
subcarrier M− 1 etc. Then the index n in Xn, j or Xn,k denotes both the subcarrier index and bit
location.
4.3.2 The authentication procedure
We use subcarrier n to show the basic principle of PHY-CRAM, with two participants B j and
Bk. Without loss of generality, assume that Bk wants to start a conversation with B j. The mutual
authentication between them contains three stages as shown in figure 4.2.
In stage 0, Bk sends an “authentication request” frame to B j. The frame contains only traffic
information, so only symbol 1 is used. All the information in this frame is not encrypted. This
frame does not reveal CSI information to the attackers, since there is no pilot or synchronization
header and the amplitudes of all subcarriers are randomized.
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After receiving the authentication request, B j authenticates Bk in stage 1. If Bk passes the
authentication, B j will also be authenticated by Bk (actually Bk does not need to know the result
in stage 1, but can always send challenge to start the authentication; however, B j responds to this
challenge only if Bk passes the authentication in stage 1). The mutual authentication succeeds if
and only if both stage 1 and stage 2 show positive results. One-way authentication can be realized
by only applying stage 0 and stage 1.
Figure 4.2: The basic procedure of PHY-CRAM
During stages 1 and 2, a typical challenge-response procedure is defined. Detailed steps of
stage 1 are shown in figure 4.3, while those of stage 2 can be derived by switching two partici-
pants. These steps include:
Step (1) At time t1, B j uses a random number Dn within the range [K3,K4] to modulate am-
plitudes of subcarriers in the last K2 OFDM symbols, where 0 < K3 < 1 < K4, and transmits the
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resulting frame to Bk. Here Dn is a random number with the purpose to prevent the attacker from
probing the channel. This frame is actually a challenge for authentication.
Step (2) Bk receives DnHjk,n +W
(1)
n , where Hjk,n denotes the wireless channel between B j and
Bk at the nth subcarrier, and W
(1)
n the AWGN. As a response to the challenge, M (Xn,k)/(DnHjk,n +W
(1)
n )
is transmitted by Bk at time t2, where Xn,k is the nth element in Xk and M (·) denotes a constellation
mapping scheme. The shared key Xk is masked by the wireless channel Hjk,n. At time t3, this
frame arrives at B j , who authenticates Bk according to its received signal. Both B j and Bk should
do these processing fast enough to ensure that t3− t1  TC.
The signals defined in these two steps as shown in figure 4.3 are classified as PHY-CRAM
information, and are modulated on the last K2 OFDM symbols. Similar to the “authentication
request” frame, traffic information in stage 1 and stage 2 is carried in the first OFDM symbol.







which maps the binary values to positive real values K3 or K4. In other words, we adopt amplitude
modulation (AM) for PHY-CRAM information, while K3 and K4 determine both the randomness
of Dn and the euclidean distance of the constellation. The ratio K4/K3 should be large enough to
hide the CSI, while too large value of K4/K3 leads to high transmission power at some subcarriers.
In practice, [K3,K4] should have the similar range as the channel fading (the normalized value of
Hjk,n) has. For example, if the largest channel gain is 10 dB larger than the smallest channel gain
in all subcarriers, it is appropriate to set K3 = 0.5 and K4 = 1.5.
The key feature of this authentication mechanism is that, the shared key Xn,k is secured by the
wireless channel which is cancelled out at the verifier, and only the verifier can derive Xn,k in
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Figure 4.3: Detailed steps in stage 1 of PHY-CRAM
multipath environments.









+W (2)n . (4.2)
In real systems, all the signals modulated on subcarriers are complex values, with real and
imaginary parts represented by I-branch and Q-branch respectively. However, phases of all sig-
nals defined in steps (1) and (2) are useless, since they adopt AM modulation. Therefore, all the
notations defined in this section represent their absolute values.
Timing must be met during the procedure, otherwise the wireless channel is no longer recipro-
cal. In static channels with pedestrians walking around at a speed of 1 m/s, TC is around 20 ms,
while in high mobility environments with moving speed 30 m/s, TC is around 0.7 ms, when carrier
frequency equals to 2.4 GHz. On the other hand, off-the-shelf wireless devices can maintain the
round-trip delay well below 0.7 ms (not including the processing delay at application layer), while
our prototype achieves a round-trip delay of only 36 μs.
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4.3.3 The verification scheme
In step (2) of stage 1, B j needs to verify that whether the counterpart is legal or not through the
response received, while Bk meets exactly the same problem in stage 2. So we only take B j as an
example.
To enhance the signal quality, B j combines the received signals on all subcarriers, and get




Moreover, B j knowns Xk since it is the shared key. Then B j wants to verity the identity of Bk
through comparison between R(2) and Xk. To be precise, we define this problem as follows:
Problem 1 : Given R(2) and Xk, make a decision on whether frame (2) is sent from Bk or not.
















Then we get the following relationship
R(2)	D = [X0,k, ...,XM−1,k]T = Xk (4.6)
where D := [D0, ...,DM−1]T is known by B j (since D is generated by B j), while the unknown
channel responses Hk j,n and Hjk,n cancel each other.
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With existence of low noises and slight difference between Hk j,n and Hjk,n, R(2)	D and Xk are
not exactly the same, but should be similar. Therefore, a straightforward solution to Problem 1 is
to check the Euclidean distance between Xk and R(2)	D:
Solution 1: Frame (2) is sent from Bk if and only if ||R(2)	D−Xk|| < C0, where C0 is a
constant real number.

However, it is hard to determine C0, since bounding Euclidean distance is hard. On the other
hand, the value of cross-correlation is tightly bounded between [0,1]. Then we define R̄D and X̄k
as mean values of R(2)	D and Xk respectively, and give another solution:
Solution 2: Frame (2) is sent from Bk if and only if
(R(2)	D− R̄D)H · (Xk− X̄k)
||R(2)	D− R̄D|| · ||Xk− X̄k||
<C1. (4.7)

The value of parameter C1 in Solution 2 must be selected properly in order to get a balance between
the successful authentication rate β (the rate that a legitimate user passes the authentication) and
false acceptance rate α (the rate that an attacker passes the authentication). We will use receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) to evaluate PHY-CRAM’s performance.
4.3.4 Peak reduction
Let’s focus on the response T (2)n := M (Xn,k)/(DnHjk,n +W
(1)
n ) sent by Bk in step (2) of stage 1.
The absolute value of T (2)n may be extremely large if (1) M (Xn,k) = K4, (2) Dn = K3 and (3)
Hjk,n experiences deep fading (|Hjk,n|  1). The probability that these three conditions occur
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simultaneously is low; as a result, the number of high peaks is small compared to the number
of subcarrier N. However, a few high peaks at frequency-domain may cause multiple issues for
wireless communication systems. For examples, the transmission powers at some subcarriers may
exceed the limitation defined by the regulator, and the peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR) may
be deteriorated. Note that, we always normalize the baseband signal so that the average power
over all subcarriers is constant, in order to fit the dynamic range of downstream components at
the transmitter (like digital-to-analogue converter and amplifier). As a result, the high peaks at
some subcarriers does not increase the the total transmission power, but actually decrease the
transmission power at other subcarriers, and may reduce the spectrum efficiency.




T (2)n , i f |T (2)n | ≤ Amax
AmaxT
(2)
n /|T (2)n |, otherwise
(4.8)
where T̃ (2)n denotes the signal after peak reduction, and Amax denotes the maximum allowable
amplitude of the signal at any subcarrier.
In (4.8), all the high peaks are cut off, and the channel effect cannot be cancelled out. However,
since all subcarriers are independent, the peak reduction operation does not affect the subcarriers
without high peaks (named good subcarriers). Since good subcarriers dominate the system, the
peak reduction operation does not affect the value of C1 too much, and, as a result, have limited
effect on the verification scheme (either Solution 1 or Solution 2).
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4.3.5 Effect of timing offset
When CP is used for timing synchronization, timing offset is more serious, since the peak of CP-
correlator is smooth. Performance of traditional OFDM systems is not affected as long as the
timing offset plus channel delay spread (in number of samples) does not exceeds L (we call this
kind of timing offset as “tolerated timing offset"), since the effect of timing offset is absorbed by
channel estimation [114]. Now we analyse the effect of tolerated timing offset to PHY-CRAM
where channel estimation is absent.
Assume that the timing offset at Bk in step (1) and at B j in step (2) are δk and δ j respectively.






k j,n =Hk j,ne
j2πδ j/N respectively. Then in the ideal case of static channel











which has the same amplitude but different phase compared with (4.5). As only the amplitude is
used for further processing, the performance of PHY-CRAM with existence of tolerated timing
offsets at either B j or Bk is not affected. Once δk or δ j exceed L, SNR is reduced dramatically, and
CRC in symbol 1 may be wrong; we classify this situation as frame drop/error, rather than timing
offset. Any frame drop/error causes time-out and triggers retransmission of the same frame.
4.3.6 Effect of frequency offset
Frequency offset comes from two sources: LO drift between Tx and Rx, and Doppler effect. It
imposes two impairments to OFDM systems: ICI and phase shifts [116]. Most short range OFDM
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systems have large subcarrier spacing, which is much bigger than frequency offset caused by LO
drift and Doppler shift. For example, the WiFi system features subcarrier spacing of 312.5 KHz,
while the frequency offset mentioned above is at the level of 3 KHz. As a result, ICI can been
ignored in such system. Due to the same reason analysed in subsection 4.3.5, phase shifts caused
by either timing offset or frequency offset do not affect PHY-CRAM. Therefore, frequency offset
estimation and compensation are unnecessary in PHY-CRAM. The real-world testing we conduct
show good results without frequency offset compensation.
4.4 Analyses on the attacks
To evaluate the security strength of PHY-CRAM, we analyse various types of attackers in this
section. Without loss of generality, we only take subcarrier n for example.
4.4.1 Passive attackers
A passive attacker EP only monitors all frames inside the network during authentication, and tries
to learn {X j,Xk} from whatever it gets. If EP learns something in {X j,Xk}, it may initiate an
authentication procedure with some users; however, as long as EP is silent during legitimate users’
authentication procedure, it is still considered as passive.
Stage 0 does not need to be secured, since it does not reveal the shared key or CSI.
As shown in figure 4.3, stages 1 and 2 are symmetrical with each other and undergo the same
passive attacks. Therefore, we only analyse stage 1.
We first assume that EP is not too close to B j and Bk, so that h jk, h jE and hkE are all uncorrelated
(case 1). The noises at EP’s receiver are ignored. Then all the frames received by EP, except “link
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set up request" which contain no information about the shared keys, are








where HjE,n and HkE,n denotes the wireless channels between B j and EP, and between Bk and EP,
respectively. In (4.10) and (4.11), five unknown factors exist in two equations, despite of the noise.
Therefore, there is no way for EP to derive Xk.
Note that if Dn is not random but a value known by everyone, EP is able to estimate HjE,n in
stage 1 and HkE,n in stage 2, according to (4.10). Then EP can estimate Xn,k/Hjk,n in stage 1 and
Xn, j/Hjk,n in stage 2 according to (4.11). As a result, Xn,k/Xn, j is known by EP, and the shared
keys between B j and Bk are compromised to some degree.
Then we consider two more aggressive cases that, EP is very close to B j (case 2) and Bk (case
3) respectively. Then besides (4.10) and (4.11), EP gets more information. For case 2, it gets
HjE,n ≈ 1 (4.12)
because the direct path between EP and B j is much stronger than any multipath if they are very
close to each other, and
Hjk,n ≈ HkE,n (4.13)
which is obvious.
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Combing 4.10 to 4.13 and ignoring the noise, we have
Xn,k ≈ R(1)E,nR(2)E,n (4.14)
and interestingly, for case 3, we get the same result as in (4.14).
As a result, EP is able to get a rough estimate on Xk through what it hears for both case 2 and
case 3. It seems dangerous to PHY-CRAM. However, EP cannot be too close to B j or Bk, since
each radio occupies a certain area of space, and it is impossible in most cases for EP to go inside of
another radio. Furthermore, due to the approximation in (4.12) and (4.13), Xk estimated by EP is
very noisy (due to the channel variations over space), while Bk has perfect information about Xk.
Therefore, the attacker EP is still identifiable.
A passive attacker is able to derive part of the information in Xk from channel correlation among
adjacent subcarriers. We consider this as a truncation to the shared key. Actually if we modulate
shared keys on a selected set of subcarriers with a spacing bigger than the coherence bandwidth, a
passive attacker will learn nothing about Xk through channel correlation. The maximum number of
shared keys in this ideal case determines the security strength of PHY-CRAM, which is analysed
in section 4.5.4.
4.4.2 Active attackers
A passive attacker EA may transmit messages to facilitate his attacks.
If an attacker initiates stage 0 (sends authentication request to B j), it will be authenticated by B j
in stage 1, and it can hardly succeed since it does not have the shared key. On the other hand, stage
1 is more vulnerable than the other two stages, since during stage 0 Bk does not know the legality
of its counterpart. After procedure 1 is finished successfully, B j will know that whether Bk is legal
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or not, and any further response to Bk is safe. Therefore, a threat to PHY-CRAM comes from step
(2) in procedure 1, since Bk needs to identify whether the challenge is sent from B j or not.
We first assume that all users are active and will respond to all requests timely. Therefore,
in step (1) B j will definitely sends a challenge. Moreover, since the channel is symmetrical in
two directions, B j is able to adjust its transmission power properly to guarantee a nearly constant
SNR at Bk, with the help from its received signal’s SNR at stage 0. The underlying assumption
here is that, in stage 0 the transmission power of Bk must be constant (transmission power on each
subcarrier is random, but the overall transmission power is constant). In this way, any active attacks
during step (1) or (2) can be easily detected. For example, if EA tries to overcast B j’s signal by
using high transmission power, Bk detects the attack directly; on the other hand, if EA maintains the
signal at the same power level, it cannot effectively modify the challenge information as it wants.
Note that due to the absence of any pre-known signal contained in all OFDM symbols, there is no
way for EA to estimate the channel between itself and Bk in order to modify the challenge signal
precisely; the only way EA can modify the challenge is to overcast it by high transmission power.
As a result, PHY-CRAM is still safe facing active attackers.
In case that B j does not send respond to Bk timely, EA may take the role of B j successfully, and
steal Xk from the response of Bk. We solve this problem by sharing two distinguished keys, X j
and Xk, between B j and B j. After Bk has been authenticated by B j, Bk also authenticates B j; if B j
cannot provide a valid response, Bk would consider that its shared key has been compromised and
revoke it. Moreover, EA cannot actively steal the shared key since it impersonates B j; it can only
wait for other users to initiate the conversation, as shown in figure 4.2.
The active attack introduced in [85] requires that both participants in the authentication pro-
cedure send pre-known sounding signals. However, in PHY-CRAM, the sounding signals Dn are
random signals, so neither two participants nor attackers can derive CSI.
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4.4.3 Impersonation attacks
Although impersonation attacks [78] belong to active attacks, it is emphasized here due to its
significant threat to other physical-layer security schemes [76, 77, 102, 103, 106, 117]. Two kinds
of impersonation attacks, signal replay attack, and feature replay attack, are analysed here.
In a signal replay attack, the attacker E stores the waveforms shown in (4.10) and (4.11), and
use 4.11 to impersonate Bk. However, E cannot succeed for two reasons. Firstly, the challenge
sent from B j contains a random number Dn, and an old version of (4.11) cannot be used in future
authentication procedures. Secondly, even if Dn is unchanged, HkE,n also randomizes (4.11) and
makes this waveforms useless.
Feature replay attack is also similar to “mimicry attack” as introduced in [81]. Conventional
physical-layer security schemes rely on training sequence and synchronization sequences for chan-
nel estimation and timing/frequency synchronization at the counterpart. As a result, CSIs become
no longer random to the attacker, while the attacker is able to forge frames that show legal shared
key at B j.
However, in PHY-CRAM no training or synchronization sequences exist, and the challenge
signal is randomized by Dn. Timing and frequency synchronization are realized by CP, while
channel estimation is not necessary. Therefore, the attacker cannot derive CSI, and cannot control
the signal arrives at legitimate users. As a result, feature replay becomes impossible, only except
that the attacker is very close to one of the participants.
We notice that, the information contained in OFDM symbol 1 are related with the identity of Tx
and Rx, as well as the logic of PHY-CRAM protocol. If an attacker knows that B j is authenticating
Bk, it knows the content of source/destination MAC address and frame type directly. As a result,
by using the known information in symbol 1 as a “training signal”, the attacker would be able
to estimate the channel. However, what the attacker gets here is just phase information (because
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symbol 1 is DPSK modulated with randomized amplitude on each subcarrier), while the shared
keys are represented by amplitudes, which show little correlation to the phase. Therefore, by
using different modulation schemes, PHY-CRAM is able to keep the useful CSI (the amplitudes of
subcarriers) secret to the attacker.
4.5 Performance Evaluation
Performance of PHY-CRAM is determined by many factors, including signal quality, randomness
of the channel over space, processing delay, key length M, and distance between legitimate user
and attacker etc.
Signal quality affects PHY-CRAM’s performance dramatically. When signal quality is good,
the cross-correlation in (4.7) generates a high value, the threshold C1 can be high, and the false
alarm rate is low accordingly, and vice versus. As introduced in section 4.3, frequency offset
and tolerated timing offset does not affect PHY-CRAM, and channel estimation is unnecessary.
Therefore, signal quality in PHY-CRAM is mainly determined by noises and deep fading. We will
evaluate how these two factors affect PHY-CRAM’s performance by computer based simulations.
Randomness of the channel over space determines the ability of PHY-CRAM to resist passive
attackers and feature replay attackers that are very close to one of the legitimate users, as discussed
in subsection 4.4. Processing delay determines how small t3− t1 could be, and how well the re-
ciprocal property of the wireless channel is maintained. These factors are closely related with
channel’s spatial and temporal correlation characteristics, as well as implementation issues. As
a result, we design a prototype for PHY-CRAM and conduct extensive real-world testing in vari-
ous channel environments to evaluate these factors. The prototype contains MAC, baseband and
radio frequency (RF) designs, among those the baseband signal processing algorithms and MAC
protocol are realized on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) platform to ensure low latency.
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4.5.1 Simulation results
We conduct Monte Carlo simulation to get an initial estimate on the performance of PHY-CRAM
with respect to noises, multipaths, the number of repetitions K2, and key length M, while W , N
and L are fixed at 10 MHz, 64 and 16, respectively. There are 100 pairs of legitimate users. The
rural/urban channels defined in [93] are selected as channel models, with 10/20 multipaths, fixed
amplitudes and random phase shifts. Maximum delay spread of two channels equal to 0.528 μs
and 2.14 μs, respectively, the latter of which exceeds the length of CP adopted in the simulation.
In other words, we select a very bad urban channel in order to evaluate the effect of deep fading
to PHY-CRAM’s performance. We adopt DQPSK modulation for symbol 1 due to its good bal-
ance between spectrum efficiency and BER performance, and conduct peak reduction for the rest
symbols.
Figure 4.4 plots a snapshot of the frequency-domain channel response’s amplitudes (|Hjk,n|) in
urban channel, where most amplitudes fall in the range of [0.5,2.5]. The fading condition in rural
channel is much better. As a result, we set K3 = 0.5, K4 = 2.5 and Amax = 5 in the simulations.
Performance of PHY-CRAM is represented by ROC, which reflects successful authentication
rate (the rate that two legitimate users pass the authentication, denoted as β) versus false acceptance
rate (the rate that an attacker passes the authentication conducted by a legitimate user, denoted
as α). Moreover, the performance of both one-way authentication (stages 0 and 1) and mutual
authentication (stages 0, 1 and 2) are evaluated. For both cases, legitimate users use shared keys
for authentication, while a naive attacker generates length-M random vectors for authentication.
The performance of PHY-CRAM with respect to K2 is shown in figure 4.5, where all ROC
curves are derived in the rural channel with SNR=10 dB. It is shown that, the performance en-
hancement is not obvious when K2 > 3. Since larger K2 leads to larger energy consumption, we
set K2 = 3 in the following simulations.
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Figure 4.4: Amplitude of the frequency-domain channel response |Hjk,n| in urban channel over
subcarrier index




























Figure 4.5: ROC curves of PHY-CRAM for one-way authentication under rural channel derived
by simulation, with various settings for K2
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Figures 4.6 and 4.7 plot the ROC curves for one-way and mutual authentication under rural and
urban channels with key length M = 40 and 60, respectively. As expected, larger M and higher


































































































Figure 4.6: ROC curves of PHY-CRAM for one-way (a)(b) and mutual (c)(d) authentication under

































































































Figure 4.7: ROC curves of PHY-CRAM for one-way (a)(b) and mutual (c)(d) authentication under
rural channel (a)(c) and urban channel (b)(d) derived by simulation, with key length M = 60
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Figure 4.8: Block diagram of the prototype
Figure 4.9: Receiver branch of RF circuits designed by discrete RF components
4.5.2 Design of the prototype
Block diagram of the prototype is given in figure 4.8, which is composed of Altera Cyclone III
FPGA, analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) and digital-to-analogue converter (DAC) fabricated
by ADI, RF circuits, a switch and an antenna. The FPGA features 120K logic elements, 4M
memory, 288 multipliers and 531 I/O pins, and is mounted on a Terasic Cyclone III development
board, while ADC and DAC on a daughter board are manufactured by the same company. These
two boards connect each other through the High Speed Mezzanine Card (HSMC) interface defined
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by Altera. Analogue inputs/outputs of the daughter board are connected to Rx/Tx branch of RF
circuits, which are designed using discrete RF components. These two branches are connected
to a switch to realize a half duplex transceiver. On/off state of the switch is controlled by FPGA
through I/O pins. Figure 4.8 shows the picture of the whole prototype.
Moreover, principle of Rx branch in the RF circuits is shown in figure 4.9. The RF signal from
switch is amplified by one or two low-noise amplifiers (LNAs), split into two identical streams,
and sent to the ‘RF’ ports of two mixers, respectively. Meanwhile, the carrier signal from signal
generator (the LO) is sent to another power splitter with 90◦ phase shift between two outputs, in
order to get in-phase and quadrature carriers. Then these two carriers are sent to the ‘LO’ ports,
and the baseband signal with real part (I-branch) and imaginary part (Q-branch) can be derived
from the ‘IF’ ports, of two mixers respectively. The Tx branch has the same structure as that of
the Rx branch with different signal directions. The system operates on 2412 MHz which falls into
the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band. Transmission power for all frames is between -5
dBm to 5 dBm according to the distance between Tx and Rx.
The whole PHY-CRAM mechanism is implemented on FPGA to ensure low processing delay.
4.5.3 The real-world testing
We conduct extensive real-world testing using the prototype to further evaluate PHY-CRAM’s per-
formance. Four channel types are considered: line-of-sight (LOS) with 3-meter distance between
Tx and Rx (LOS-3m), LOS-6m, non-line-of-sight (NLOS) with 6-meter distance (NLOS-6m), and
LOS-28m. The first three channels are inside of a garage with a truck and metal roof, while the
last one locates at a courtyard with concrete ground and surrounded by walls. Radios of legiti-
mate users use CP for timing synchronization, while do not conduct frequency offset estimation
or compensation. Two sets of prototype acts as B j and Bk respectively, while other two sets of
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prototype act as two attackers, who mounts their antennae 10 m and 0.1 m away from B j respec-
tively. Bk starts the conversation and is identified by B j, as introduced in subsection 4.3.2. During
the authentication procedure, attackers record all the frames and try to figure out Xk. The nearby
attacker estimates Xk according to (4.14) (we call it smart attacker), while the far away attacker
generates values for Xk randomly (we call it naive attacker). The naive attacker defined here helps
us to evaluate the upper-bound of PHY-CRAM’s performance, as well as to detect any hardware
imperfection. Finally, two attackers start their conversations with B j and uses their estimates on
Xk as the response to B j’s challenge.
Although in real situation Bk only has one set of Xk, 99 different values of Xk are tested in
different runs in order to cover a more general case. In other words, we test 99 different legitimate
users with one pair of radios by changing the software, while each user’s authentication procedure
is repeated for 5 times. The successful authentication rates for all users in all runs in a certain
channel are averaged, while results belonging to different channels are separated. SNRs at Rx for
all frames are maintained at 15 dB to 20 dB, by adjusting the transmission power and the gain
of Rx’s LNA. We set K1 = 0.5 and K2 = 1.5 since the frequency-domain channel response on all
subcarriers fall in the range of [0.5,1.5] in most cases in all channel conditions, and K2 = 3. Amax
is set to 8 due to hardware limitations (mainly due to the maximum range of integers that can be
presented by FPGA in our design). All other design parameters adopt the same values as used in
the simulations.
We first measure t3 − t1 (the round-trip latency of one-way authentication defined in figure
4.3) by examining the signal received by passive attackers (the attacker might never expect that it
facilitates system testing). It is found that t3− t1 is as low as 36 μs, and is pretty stable. This is the
benefit we get from FPGA design, with the price of much longer development time compared with
that of the digital signal processor (DSP) based solution.
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The ROC curves with existence of the naive attacker under four channel types are plotted in fig-
ure 4.10, which shows very good performance under all channel types. Successful authentication
rate and false acceptance rate follow the same definitions as those in subsection 4.5.1. Perfor-
mance of PHY-CRAM in short-distance channels is even better than those obtained by simulation,
because the delay spreads in these channels are much lower than those assumed in the simulations,
and the low-SNR case (SNR=10 dB) is avoided. Figure 4.10 also validates the reciprocal property
of the wireless channel, and shows the near-perfect upper-bound of PHY-CRAM’s performance in
good channel conditions.
The ROC curves with existence of a smart attacker under four channel types are plotted in figure
4.11. Performance differs dramatically in different channels. Short-distance LOS channels show
the best performance, followed by short-distance NLOS case. Long distance LOS channel is the
worst case, since 0.1 m is too short compared with 28 m, and the approximation in (4.13) becomes
more precise. However, the attacker does not always have chance to stay so close to the legitimate
user.




























































Figure 4.10: ROC curves of PHY-CRAM for one-way (a) and mutual (b) authentication derived






























































Figure 4.11: ROC curves of PHY-CRAM for one-way (a) and mutual (b) authentication derived
from real-world testing under four channels, with existence of a smart attacker
4.5.4 Security analysis
Shared keys are encrypted by the wireless channel in PHY-CRAM, so the security strength of PHY-
CRAM is determined by the entropy of wireless channel. The real-world experiments in [118]
reveals that, each independent channel provides 4.38 bits of entropy with 0.5 dB quantization
accuracy, and 3.5 bits of entropy with 1 dB quantization accuracy, while the quantization accuracy
is mainly determined by SNR. In PHY-CRAM, there is no quantization step. However, higher SNR
leads to a larger value of C1 in (4.7), and as a result, more efforts for attackers to forge a shared
key that satisfies (4.7); this is equivalent to a larger entropy on the encryption key that secures the
shared keys.
Given the works in [118], we make a moderate assumption that each independent channel pro-
vides 4 bits of entropy. Then the overall entropy of the wireless channel is determined by the
number of independent channels over the frequency band occupied by the wireless network, which
equals to W/BC, where BC denotes the coherence bandwidth. According to [86], BC = 1/(5στ),
where στ denotes the root mean square (RMS) delay of the wireless channel. For a WiFi system
running at 20 MHz bandwidth with στ = 0.2 μs, the overall entropy is 80 bits.
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Note that the system provided in this chapter is only a baseline of PHY-CRAM. Additional
entropy can be obtained by utilizing the time-varying characteristic of the wireless channel, i.e., to
partition the shared keys into multiple pieces and conduct authentication for all of them in multiple
runs of the baseline PHY-CRAM procedure. The time interval between two runs should be larger
than the channel coherence time TC. In this case, β of each run will be enhanced; this can be easily
achieved by increasing SNR or enlarging K2. Doing this kind of repetition does not leak more
information to attackers, but takes more time and consumes more energy.
4.5.5 Comparison with conventional authentication algorithms
Compared with conventional challenge-response authentication schemes, PHY-CRAM consumes
less power at transceivers’ baseband, due to the missing of channel estimation and frequency offset
estimation for all OFDM symbols, and the missing of channel coding and decoding for PHY-
CRAM information.
On the flip side, PHY-CRAM requires higher transmission power compared with conventional
schemes. For performance comparison, we assume that the length of (encrypted) shared key is
60 bits, K2 = 2, while conventional schemes adopt rate 1/2 convolutional encoder, Viterbi decoder
and LMMSE estimator [119]. Conventional schemes need to maintain a BER of 8E-4 to keep β in
one-way authentication above 95%, and the corresponding SNR under the rural channels simulated
in subsection (4.5.1) is about 10 dB, while PHY-CRAM requires 13-15 dB SNR under the same
conditions.
Figure 4.12 gives rough estimation on the dynamic power consumptions of both transceivers
with respect to the distance between Tx and Rx, if the baseband of transceiver is designed by
FPGA, DSP and application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), respectively. We consider that dy-
namic power consumption equals PBS (dynamic power consumed at baseband) plus PRF (dynamic
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power consumed at RF). In our FPGA design, PBS ≈ 100 mW, which is about 15 mW less than
the power consumption of conventional baseband; this is mainly due to the elimination of Viterbi
decoder IP core, which consumes 12 mW dynamic power [120]. DSP design and ASIC design
for the same function are believed to consume about 10 times [121] and 10% [122] of the power
consumed by FPGA, respectively. We ignore the power consumed at the Rx’s RF circuitry and
assume that PRF = ηPT , where η and PT denote the power efficiency and power level of the RF
amplifier at Tx. Moreover, the signal power at Rx with distance d is modelled by PT/(L0dγ), which
must satisfy the SNR requirements (15 dB for PHY-CRAM and 10 dB for conventional system),
with L0 and γ denoting pathloss at d = 1m and pathloss exponent, respectively. We assume that
W = 10 MHz, noise floor equals to -114 dBm/MHz, η = 0.25, L0 = 104, and γ = 3.3 [123]. Based
on these conditions, PHY-CRAM consumes less power than the cryptographic system when com-























































































Figure 4.12: Rough estimation on the power consumptions of conventional wireless transceiver
during authentication and the transceiver of PHY-CRAM
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4.6 Summary
We proposed a novel mutual challenge-response authentication mechanism named PHY-CRAM,
which is simple, low-complexity, robust, and flexible. By eliminating any training and synchro-
nization sequences, the CSI is kept secret to attackers, while the transmission of shared keys are
secured by CSI. We analyzed the security strength of PHY-CRAM under various attacks. With the
existence of a naive feature replay attacker, PHY-CRAM achieves almost perfect performance in
dense multipath environments. When there exists a smart attacker, PHY-CRAM still works well
under various channel conditions.
Moreover, PHY-CRAM is prototyped by FPGA and discrete RF components. Based on this
prototype, we conducted real-world tests to validate PHY-CRAM’s performance, and eliminated
channel modelling error. These testing results show that the reciprocal property of wireless channel
is well maintained when processing delays of the challenge-response signals are less than 40 μs,
and that PHY-CRAM is robust under various channel environments.
Security strength of PHY-CRAM increases proportionally to RMS delay and bandwidth of the
wireless channel. Energy consumption of PHY-CRAM can be comparable to or even lower than
that of cryptographic authentication schemes in short range applications. As a result, PHY-CRAM




Mobile broadband channels, which suffer from time-varying effect and FSF, are experienced by
4G communication systems in mobile environments. We argue that these channels not only in-
crease the complexity of these 4G systems, but also provide new opportunities for information
security. The main body of this thesis can be divided into two parts, which discuss challenges and
opportunities respectively.
In the first part, a channel estimation algorithm named piece-wise time-invariant approxima-
tion (PITIA) is proposed to effectively estimate HST channels which are typical mobile broadband
channels. PITIA first identifies a specific feature of HST channels which is not discussed in con-
ventional TVCE algorithm, and adopts a non-linear channel model which has the smallest number
of parameters among all channel models. Then this non-linear and time-varying channel model
is approximated by a series of linear and time-invariant channels, through which the time-varying
effect and FSF are decoupled and estimated separately. This novel design both reduces estima-
tion error and maintains low computation complexity. According to extensive simulation results
derived from a self-developed LTE simulator, PITIA outperforms conventional BEM methods in
typical HST environments by 5-8 dB in high-SNR regime.
PITIA not only serves as a novel TVCE algorithm, but also showcases a general idea to solve
complex problems: dividing the whole task into multiple simpler ones and solving them individu-
ally. The same idea may apply to other fields of studies, for example, non-linear system analysis
where the non-linear system may be approximated by a series of linear systems and analysed one
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by one. Performances of PITIA can be further enhanced by several ways: (1) more advanced
non-linear signal processing techniques may be adopted to reduce the extra noise generated during
channel reconstruction; (2) interference coming from data symbols may also be reduced by joint
channel estimation and data detection algorithms. Moreover, PITIA is not fully compatible with
LTE specification, since PITIA requires that pilots are surrounded by nulls while LTE is not de-
signed like this. Compatibility with commercial OFDM systems is still a challenge for most TVCE
algorithms.
In the second part, we devise the first non-cryptographic challenge-response authentication
mechanism (PHY-CRAM) to leverage new opportunities. During authentication, no pilot is trans-
mitted, and the shared keys between both participants are randomized by mobile broadband chan-
nels. The FSF’s perceived by both participants at the same time are identical and cancelled by
an division operation, while an eavesdropper, locating at a different place for sure and perceiving
different FSF, can neither estimate channel nor decode shared keys. Performance of PHY-CRAM
is evaluated by a FPGA-based hardware platform and real-world experiments, which validate that
PHY-CRAM achieves very high successful authentication rate when false acceptance rate is very
low, even if there is an eavesdropper nearby. Moreover, PHY-CRAM achieves higher energy ef-
ficiency in small-scale networks compared with cryptographic authentication protocols, and finds
applications in WLAN and DSRC.
PHY-CRAM validates the previously mentioned concept that mobile broadband channels bene-
fit information security, and we believe that these channels may also benefit other fields of studies,
for examples, information forensics and localization. PHY-CRAM adopts the FSF channel model
which does not fully utilize the randomness of mobile broadband channels, while the DSF chan-
nel model is a better but more challenging choice. Furthermore, the phases in channel responses
are abandoned in PHY-CRAM, since they are sensitive to timing synchronization error and hard-
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ware imperfection, and may not be perfectly cancelled. The performance of PHY-CRAM may be
enhanced by further addressing these issues.
Finally, the thesis is concluded by a philosophy that, challenges and opportunities are two sides
of a coin, and researchers should never be frustrated by the sophistication of the nature.
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[103] B. Danev and S. Čapkun, “Transient-based identification of wireless sensor nodes,” in
IPSN ’09: Proceedings of the 8th IEEE/ACM Information Processing in Sensor Networks.
IEEE/ACM, 2009, pp. 25–36.
[104] A. Mikkilineni, “Forensic characterization of rf devices,” in Information Forensics and Se-
curity, 2009. WIFS 2009. First IEEE International Workshop on, Dec 2009, pp. 26–30.
[105] K. Zeng, K. Govindan, D. Wu, and P. Mohapatra, “Identity-based attack detection in mobile
wireless networks,” in INFOCOM, 2011 Proceedings IEEE, april 2011, pp. 1880 –1888.
94
[106] J. Hall, “Enhancing intrusion detection in wireless networks using radio frequency finger-
printing,” in In Proceedings of the 3rd IASTED International Conference on Communica-
tions, Internet and Information Technology (CIIT. Kranakis, 2004, pp. 201–206.
[107] P. Harmer, M. Williams, and M. Temple, “Using de-optimized lfs processing to enhance
4g communication security,” in Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN), 2011
Proceedings of 20th International Conference on, 2011, pp. 1–8.
[108] D. R. Reising, M. A. Temple, and M. J. Mendenhall, “Improving intra-cellular security using
air monitoring with rf fingerprints,” in Wireless Communications and Networking Confer-
ence (WCNC), 2010, pp. 1–6.
[109] Z. Li, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and B. Nath;, “Robust statistical methods for securing wireless
localization in sensor networks,” in Information Processing in Sensor Networks, 2005. IPSN
2005, 2005, pp. 91–98.
[110] S.-P. Kuo and Y.-C. Tseng, “Discriminant minimization search for large-scale rf-based lo-
calization systems,” Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 291–304,
Feb 2011.
[111] T. Wang, J. Proakis, E. Masry, and J. Zeidler, “Performance degradation of ofdm systems
due to doppler spreading,” Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5, no. 6,
pp. 1422–1432, June 2006.
[112] P. Tan and N. C. Beaulieu, “Precise ber analysis of 4-dqpsk ofdm with carrier frequency off-
set over frequency selective fast fading channels,” Wireless Communications, IEEE Trans-
actions on, Oct 2007.
[113] D. Lee and K. Cheun, “A new symbol timing recovery algorithm for ofdm systems,” Con-
sumer Electronics, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 767–775, Aug 1997.
[114] M. Morelli and U. Mengali, “A comparison of pilot-aided channel estimation methods for
ofdm systems,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 49, no. 12, pp. 3065–3073,
Dec 2001.
[115] B. Yang, K. Letaief, R. Cheng, and Z. Cao, “Timing recovery for ofdm transmission,” Se-
lected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 18, no. 11, pp. 2278–2291, Nov
2000.
[116] Y. Mostofi and D. C. Cox, “A robust timing synchronization design in ofdm systems part i:
Low-mobility cases,” Wireless Communications, IEEE Transaction on, Dec 2007.
95
[117] J. Hall, M. Barbeau, and E. Kranakis, “Detecting rogue devices in bluetooth networks using
radio frequency fingerprinting,” in In IASTED International Conference on Communications
and Computer Networks, 2006.
[118] M. Wilhelm, I. Martinovic, and J. B. Schmitt, “Secret keys from entangled sensor motes:
Implementation and analysis,” in Proceedings of the Third ACM Conference on Wireless
Network Security (WiSec ’10). ACM, mar 2010, pp. 139–144.
[119] M.-H. Hsieh and C.-H. Wei, “Channel estimation for ofdm systems based on comb-type
pilot arrangement in frequency selective fading channels,” in Consumer Electronics, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 44, Feb. 1998, pp. 217–225.
[120] S. Shaker, S. Elramly, and K. Sheriata, “Fpga implementation of a reconfigurable viterbi
decoder for wimax receiver,” in Microelectronics (ICM), 2009 International Conference on,
2009, pp. 264–267.
[121] H. K. Boyapati and R. V. R. Kumar, “A comparison of dsp, asic, and risc dsp based imple-
mentations of multiple access in lte,” in Communications, Control and Signal Processing
(ISCCSP), 2010 4th International Symposium on, 2010, pp. 1–5.
[122] I. Kuon, I. Kuon, and J. Rose, “Measuring the gap between fpgas and asics,” in FPGA ’06
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM/SIGDA 14th international symposium on Field programmable
gate arrays, 2006, pp. 21–30.
[123] H. Hashemi, “The indoor radio propagation channel,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 81,
no. 7, pp. 943–968, July 1993.
96
